Discrete-log attacks and factorization Part II


Tanja Lange Technische Universiteit Eindhoven

14 June 2019

with some slides by Daniel J. Bernstein

Q sieve

Sieving small integers i > 0using primes 2, 3, 5, 7:



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2019

ne slides by

. Bernstein

Q sieve

Sieving small integers i > 0using primes 2, 3, 5, 7:

$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\end{array} $	2	2	
5 4 5	22	3	5
5 6 7	2	3	5
8	222	33	1
10	2	55	5
12 12	22	3	
14 15	2	3	75
15 16 17	222	-	5
18	2 22	33	
20	22		5

etc.

Q sieve

Sieving *i*using pri

20	18 19 20	15 16 17	13 14 15	11 12 13	10	8	4 5 6 7 8 9	3 4 5	1 2 3
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Q sieve

Sieving small integers i > 0using primes 2, 3, 5, 7:

$ \begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\end{array} \end{array} $	2	0	
3	22	3	
56	2	3	5
7 8	222		7
9 10	2	33	5
11	22	С	5
12		3	_
14 15	2	3	7 5
16 17	222	2	
18 10	2 22	33	
20	22		5

etc.

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Q sieve


Sieving *i* and 611 using primes 2, 3, 5

1				612	2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	2			613	
3		3		614	2
4	22			615	
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7			7	618	2
8	222			619	
9	_	33		620	2
10	2		5	621	
11		-		622	2
12	22	3		623	
13				624	2
14	2	-	_ 7	625	
15		3	5	626	2
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17				628	2
18	2	33	3	629	
18 19			_	629 630 631	2
20	22		5	631	

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Sieving small integers i > 0using primes 2, 3, 5, 7:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	2		-	
3	22		3	
5	2		2	5
0 7			3	7
8 9	22	2	33	
10	2		55	5
10 11 12	22		3	
13	2			7
14 15			3	5
16 17	22	22		
18	2		33	
19 20	2 22			5



etc.

etc.

Q sieve

Sieving *i* and 611 + i for sm using primes 2, 3, 5, 7:

		612	2 2	2			3	3		
		613	8							
3		614								
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	5	616		2	2					
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
Sieving small integers i > 0using primes 2, 3, 5, 7:

$\begin{array}{c}1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\1\end{array}$	2		
3		3	
4	22		_
5		0	5
6	2	3	7
/ 0	222		(
0 0		33	
10	2	55	5
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14	2		7
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20			5


etc.

Q sieve

Sieving *i* and 611 + i for small *i* using primes 2, 3, 5, 7:



2	2			3	3						
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2				3			5	5	5	5	
2	2			J							
2				3	3		5				7



Sieving *i* and 611 + i for small *i* using primes 2, 3, 5, 7:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9				612	2	2		3	3	
2	2			613						
3		3		614	2					
4	22			615				3		
5		5		616	2	2	2			
6	2	3		617						
7		-	7	618	2			3		
8	222			619						
9		33		620	2	2				
10	2	5		621				3	3	3
11				622	2					
12	22	3		623						
13				624	2	2	2 2	3		
14	2	-	7	625						
15		3 5		626	2					
16	2222			627				3		
17				628	2	2				
	2	33								
18 19	_			630	2			3	3	
	22	5		629 630 631				-	-	

etc.



Have co the "cor for some $14 \cdot 625$ 64 · 675 75 · 686 14 · 64 · $= 2^8 3^4 5$ gcd{611 = 47. 611 = 4

gers i > 05, 7:

Q sieve

Sieving *i* and 611 + *i* for small *i* using primes 2, 3, 5, 7:

			_										
1				612	2	2			3	3			
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4	22			615					3		5		
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	22	5		631					J	J	J		1
20		J											

etc.

Have complete fac the "congruences" for some *i*'s.

- $14 \cdot 625 = 2^1 3^0 5^4 7$
- $64 \cdot 675 = 2^6 3^3 5^2 7$ 75 \cdot 686 = 2^1 3^1 5^2 7
- $14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75 \cdot 625 \cdot 64 = 2^8 3^4 5^8 7^4 = (2^4)^{10}$
- $gcd\{611, 14 \cdot 64 \cdot 7 = 47.$
- $611 = 47 \cdot 13.$

Sieving *i* and 611 + i for small *i* using primes 2, 3, 5, 7:

				C10	0					2			
1				612	2	2			3	3			
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15		3	5	626	2								
16	2222			627					3				
17				628	2	2							
18	2	33		629									
19				630	2				3	3	5		7
20	22		5	631					-	-	-		-

Have complete factorization the "congruences" i(611 + i)for some *i*'s.

- $14 \cdot 625 = 2^{1}3^{0}5^{4}7^{1}$.
- $64 \cdot 675 = 2^6 3^3 5^2 7^0$
- $75 \cdot 686 = 2^1 3^1 5^2 7^3$.
- $14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75 \cdot 625 \cdot 675 \cdot 686$ $= 2^8 3^4 5^8 7^4 = (2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2)^2.$
- $gcd{611, 14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75 2^43^2}$ = 47.
- $611 = 47 \cdot 13$.

Sieving *i* and 611 + i for small *i* using primes 2, 3, 5, 7:

	1			1												
1						2	2			3	3					
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Have complete factorization of the "congruences" i(611 + i)for some *i*'s.

$$14 \cdot 625 = 2^1 3^0 5^4 7^1.$$

$$64 \cdot 675 = 2^6 3^3 5^2 7^0.$$

$$75 \cdot 686 = 2^1 3^1 5^2 7^3.$$

$$14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75 \cdot 625 \cdot \\= 2^8 3^4 5^8 7^4 = (2^8)^{10} 3^{10} 5^{$$

$$gcd\{611, 14 \cdot 64 = 47.$$

 $611 = 47 \cdot 13.$

etc.

 47^{1} . 27^{0}

675 · 686 $(^{4}3^{2}5^{4}7^{2})^{2}$. $\cdot \ 75 - 2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2 \big\}$ i and 611 + i for small i imes 2, 3, 5, 7:

	612 613	2	2			3	3							
		2												
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5	626	2							0	0	0	0		
	627					3								
	628	2	2											
3	629 630 631													
	630	2				3	3		5				7	
5	631													

Have complete factorization of the "congruences" i(611 + i)for some *i*'s.

 $14 \cdot 625 = 2^1 3^0 5^4 7^1$. $64 \cdot 675 = 2^6 3^3 5^2 7^0.$ $75 \cdot 686 = 2^1 3^1 5^2 7^3$.

 $14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75 \cdot 625 \cdot 675 \cdot 686$ $= 2^8 3^4 5^8 7^4 = (2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2)^2.$

 $gcd{611, 14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75 - 2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2}$ = 47.

 $611 = 47 \cdot 13.$

Why did Was it j gcd{611 No. By cons⁻ where *s* and t =So each divides e Not terr (but not that one and the

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2			3							
			3	3		5				7

Have complete factorization of the "congruences" i(611 + i) for some *i*'s.

 $14 \cdot 625 = 2^{1}3^{0}5^{4}7^{1}.$ $64 \cdot 675 = 2^{6}3^{3}5^{2}7^{0}.$ $75 \cdot 686 = 2^{1}3^{1}5^{2}7^{3}.$

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
 $gcd\{611, 14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75 - 2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2\} = 47.$

 $611 = 47 \cdot 13.$

Why did this find Was it just blind I gcd{611, random} No.

By construction 62 where $s = 14 \cdot 64$ and $t = 2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2$. So each prime > 7 divides either s - 1

Not terribly surprise (but not guarantee) that one prime dive and the other divis



Have complete factorization of the "congruences" i(611 + i) $14 \cdot 625 = 2^1 3^0 5^4 7^1$ $64 \cdot 675 = 2^6 3^3 5^2 7^0.$ $75 \cdot 686 = 2^1 3^1 5^2 7^3$. $14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75 \cdot 625 \cdot 675 \cdot 686$ $= 2^8 3^4 5^8 7^4 = (2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2)^2.$ $gcd\{611, 14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75 - 2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2\}$

No. and $t = 2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2$.

Why did this find a factor of Was it just blind luck: $gcd{611, random} = 47?$

- By construction 611 divides where $s = 14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75$
- So each prime > 7 dividing
- divides either s t or s + t.
- Not terribly surprising
- (but not guaranteed in adva
- that one prime divided s t
- and the other divided s + t.

Have complete factorization of the "congruences" i(611 + i)for some *i*'s.

 $14 \cdot 625 = 2^{1}3^{0}5^{4}7^{1}$ $64 \cdot 675 = 2^6 3^3 5^2 7^0$ $75 \cdot 686 = 2^1 3^1 5^2 7^3$

 $14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75 \cdot 625 \cdot 675 \cdot 686$ $= 2^8 3^4 5^8 7^4 = (2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2)^2.$

 $gcd\{611, 14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75 - 2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2\}$ = 47.

 $611 = 47 \cdot 13$.

Why did this find a factor of 611? Was it just blind luck: $gcd{611, random} = 47?$ No.

where $s = 14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75$ and $t = 2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2$. So each prime > 7 dividing 611 divides either s - t or s + t. Not terribly surprising

that one prime divided s - tand the other divided s + t.

By construction 611 divides $s^2 - t^2$

- (but not guaranteed in advance!)

mplete factorization of ngruences" i(611+i)*i*'s.

 $= 2^{1}3^{0}5^{4}7^{1}$. $= 2^{6}3^{3}5^{2}7^{0}$. $= 2^{1}3^{1}5^{2}7^{3}$.

75 · 625 · 675 · 686 $^{8}7^{4} = (2^{4}3^{2}5^{4}7^{2})^{2}.$


 $14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75 - 2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2$

7 · 13.

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By construction 611 divides $s^2 - t^2$ where $s = 14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75$ and $t = 2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2$. So each prime > 7 dividing 611 divides either s - t or s + t.

Not terribly surprising (but not guaranteed in advance!) that one prime divided s - tand the other divided s + t.



Why did complete have squ Was it j Yes. Th (1, 0, 4, 1)happene But we

Given lo easily fir with sur

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torization of i(611 + i)
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7¹. 7⁰. 7³.

 $575 \cdot 686$ $3^2 5^4 7^2)^2$.

 $75 - 2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2$

Why did this find a factor of 611? Was it just blind luck: gcd{611, random} = 47? No.

By construction 611 divides $s^2 - t^2$ where $s = 14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75$ and $t = 2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2$. So each prime > 7 dividing 611 divides either s - t or s + t.

Not terribly surprising (but not guaranteed in advance!) that one prime divided s - tand the other divided s + t. Why did the first completely factore have square produ Was it just blind l

Yes. The exponen (1, 0, 4, 1), (6, 3, 2, happened to have

But we didn't need Given long sequen easily find nonemp with sum 0 mod 2 of ;)

 $5^{4}7^{2}$

Why did this find a factor of 611? Was it just blind luck: gcd{611, random} = 47? No.

By construction 611 divides $s^2 - t^2$ where $s = 14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75$ and $t = 2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2$. So each prime > 7 dividing 611 divides either s - t or s + t.

Not terribly surprising (but not guaranteed in advance!) that one prime divided s - tand the other divided s + t. Why did the first three completely factored congrue have square product? Was it just blind luck? Yes. The exponent vectors (1, 0, 4, 1), (6, 3, 2, 0), (1, 1, 2) happened to have sum 0 mc

But we didn't need this luck Given long sequence of vector easily find nonempty subseq with sum 0 mod 2.

Why did this find a factor of 611? Was it just blind luck: $gcd{611, random} = 47?$ No.

By construction 611 divides $s^2 - t^2$ where $s = 14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75$ and $t = 2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2$. So each prime > 7 dividing 611 divides either s - t or s + t.

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Why did the first three completely factored congruences have square product? Was it just blind luck? Yes. The exponent vectors (1, 0, 4, 1), (6, 3, 2, 0), (1, 1, 2, 3)

happened to have sum 0 mod 2.

But we didn't need this luck! Given long sequence of vectors, easily find nonempty subsequence with sum $0 \mod 2$.

- this find a factor of 611? ust blind luck:
- , random $\} = 47?$

- truction 611 divides $s^2 t^2$ $= 14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75$ $2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2$. prime > 7 dividing 611
- either s t or s + t.
- ibly surprising
- guaranteed in advance!)
- prime divided s t
- other divided s + t.

Why did the first three completely factored congruences have square product? Was it just blind luck?

Yes. The exponent vectors

(1, 0, 4, 1), (6, 3, 2, 0), (1, 1, 2, 3)happened to have sum 0 mod 2. But we didn't need this luck! Given long sequence of vectors, easily find nonempty subsequence with sum 0 mod 2.

This is I Guarant if numbe exceeds e.g. for 1(n +4(n +15(n + 1)49(n + 4)64(n + 6)**F**₂-kerne gen by (e.g., 1(*r*, is a squa a factor of 611? uck:

= 47?

11 divides $s^2 - t^2$ · 75

7 dividing 611 $t ext{ or } s + t.$

sing ed in advance!) vided *s — t*

ded s + t.

Why did the first three completely factored congruences have square product? Was it just blind luck?

Yes. The exponent vectors (1, 0, 4, 1), (6, 3, 2, 0), (1, 1, 2, 3) happened to have sum 0 mod 2.

But we didn't need this luck! Given long sequence of vectors, easily find nonempty subsequence with sum 0 mod 2. This is linear algeb Guaranteed to find if number of vector exceeds length of

e.g. for n = 671: $1(n + 1) = 2^53^{2}$ $4(n + 4) = 2^23^{2}$ $15(n + 15) = 2^{1}3^{2}$ $49(n + 49) = 2^{4}3^{2}$ $64(n + 64) = 2^{6}3^{2}$

F₂-kernel of expor gen by $(0\ 1\ 0\ 1\ 1)$ e.g., 1(n+1)15(n)is a square. f 611?

 $s^2 - t^2$

611

nce!)

Why did the first three completely factored congruences have square product? Was it just blind luck?

Yes. The exponent vectors (1, 0, 4, 1), (6, 3, 2, 0), (1, 1, 2, 3)happened to have sum 0 mod 2.

But we didn't need this luck! Given long sequence of vectors, easily find nonempty subsequence with sum $0 \mod 2$.

This is linear algebra over **F** Guaranteed to find subseque if number of vectors exceeds length of each vector

is a square.

e.g. for n = 671:

- $1(n + 1) = 2^5 3^1 5^0 7^1;$
- $4(n + 4) = 2^2 3^3 5^2 7^0$:
- $15(n + 15) = 2^1 3^1 5^1 7^3;$
- $49(n + 49) = 2^4 3^2 5^1 7^2;$
- $64(n+64) = 2^6 3^1 5^1 7^2.$

 \mathbf{F}_2 -kernel of exponent matrix gen by (0 1 0 1 1) and (1 0 e.g., 1(n+1)15(n+15)49(n+15)40(n+15)40(n+15)40(n+15)40(n+15)40(n+15)40(n+15)40(n+15)40(n+15)40(n+15)40(n+15)40(n+15)40(n+15)40(n+15)40(n+15)40(n+15)40(n+15)40(n+15)40(n+15)40(n+15)

Why did the first three completely factored congruences have square product? Was it just blind luck?

Yes. The exponent vectors (1, 0, 4, 1), (6, 3, 2, 0), (1, 1, 2, 3)happened to have sum 0 mod 2.

But we didn't need this luck! Given long sequence of vectors, easily find nonempty subsequence with sum $0 \mod 2$.

This is linear algebra over \mathbf{F}_2 . Guaranteed to find subsequence if number of vectors exceeds length of each vector.

e.g. for n = 671: $1(n + 1) = 2^5 3^1 5^0 7^1;$ $4(n + 4) = 2^2 3^3 5^2 7^0$: $15(n + 15) = 2^1 3^1 5^1 7^3;$ $49(n + 49) = 2^4 3^2 5^1 7^2;$ $64(n + 64) = 2^{6}3^{1}5^{1}7^{2}$.

 \mathbf{F}_2 -kernel of exponent matrix is gen by $(0\ 1\ 0\ 1\ 1)$ and $(1\ 0\ 1\ 1\ 0);$ e.g., 1(n+1)15(n+15)49(n+49)is a square.

- the first three ely factored congruences are product? ust blind luck?
- e exponent vectors 1), (6, 3, 2, 0), (1, 1, 2, 3)d to have sum 0 mod 2.
- didn't need this luck! ng sequence of vectors, nd nonempty subsequence n 0 mod 2.

This is linear algebra over \mathbf{F}_2 . Guaranteed to find subsequence if number of vectors exceeds length of each vector.

e.g. for
$$n = 671$$
:
 $1(n + 1) = 2^5 3^1 5^0 7^1;$
 $4(n + 4) = 2^2 3^3 5^2 7^0;$
 $15(n + 15) = 2^1 3^1 5^1 7^3;$
 $49(n + 49) = 2^4 3^2 5^1 7^2;$
 $64(n + 64) = 2^6 3^1 5^1 7^2.$

 \mathbf{F}_2 -kernel of exponent matrix is gen by $(0\ 1\ 0\ 1\ 1)$ and $(1\ 0\ 1\ 1\ 0)$; e.g., 1(n+1)15(n+15)49(n+49)is a square.

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This is linear algebra over F_2 . Guaranteed to find subsequence if number of vectors exceeds length of each vector.

e.g. for n = 671: $1(n + 1) = 2^5 3^1 5^0 7^1$; $4(n + 4) = 2^2 3^3 5^2 7^0$; $15(n + 15) = 2^1 3^1 5^1 7^3$; $49(n + 49) = 2^4 3^2 5^1 7^2$; $64(n + 64) = 2^6 3^1 5^1 7^2$.

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Plausible conjecture: **Q** sieve succeeds with $y = \lfloor n^{1/u} \rfloor$ for all $n \ge u^{(1+o(1))u^2}$; here o(1) is as $u \to \infty$.

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
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More generally, if $\exp \sqrt{\left(\frac{1}{2c} + o(1)\right)}$ conjectured *y*-smoother is $1/y^{c+o(1)}$.

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- Smoothness chance of $i(n \dashv n)$ degrades as *i* grows.
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- Crude analysis: i(n + i) gro \approx yn if $i \approx$ y; $\approx y^2 n$ if $i \approx y^2$.
- More careful analysis:
- n + i doesn't degrade, but
- *i* is always smooth for $i \leq y$
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Can we select congruences to avoid this degradation?

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Choose q, square of large pr Choose a "q-sublattice" of i arithmetic progression of i's where q divides each i(n + i)e.g. progression $q - (n \mod q)$ $2q - (n \mod q), 3q - (n \mod q)$ etc. Check smoothness of generalized congruence i(n for *i*'s in this sublattice. e.g. check whether i, (n+i)smooth for $i = q - (n \mod q)$ Try many large q's. Rare for *i*'s to overlap.

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e.g. n = 3141592653589793

Original **Q** sieve:

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Use 997²-sublattice,

- *i* ∈ 802458 + 994009**Z**:
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Choose q, square of large prime. Choose a "q-sublattice" of i's: arithmetic progression of *i*'s where q divides each i(n + i). e.g. progression $q - (n \mod q)$, $2q - (n \mod q), \ 3q - (n \mod q),$ etc.

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/q are q) etc.

e.g. *n* = 314159265358979323: Original **Q** sieve: n+i314159265358979324 2 314159265358979325 3 314159265358979326 Use 997²-sublattice, *i* ∈ 802458 + 994009**Z**: $i (n+i)/997^2$ 316052737309 802458 316052737310 1796467 2790476 316052737311

Crude analysis: Sublattices eliminate the growth probler Have practically unlimited si of generalized congruences $(q-(n \mod q)) \frac{n+q-(n \mod q)}{q}$ between 0 and *n*. More careful analysis: Subla are even better than that! For $q \approx n^{1/2}$ have $i \approx (n+i)/q \approx n^{1/2} \approx y^{u/2}$ so smoothness chance is rou $(u/2)^{-u/2}(u/2)^{-u/2} = 2^{u/2}$ 2^{u} times larger than before.

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n+i1

- 314159265358979324
- 314159265358979325 2
- 3 314159265358979326

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i	$(n + i)/997^2$
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- i + i
- 14159265358979324 14159265358979325 14159265358979326
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- 316052737310 67
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)09**Z**: + *i*)/997² 052737309 052737310 052737311 Crude analysis: Sublattices eliminate the growth problem. Have practically unlimited supply of generalized congruences $(q-(n \mod q)) \frac{n+q-(n \mod q)}{q}$ between 0 and *n*.

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Even larger improved from changing pole

"Quadratic sieve"

 $i^2 - n$ with $i \approx \sqrt{1/2}$ have $i^2 - n \approx n^{1/2}$

much smaller than

"MPQS" improves using sublattices: But still $\approx n^{1/2}$.

"Number-field sieves $n^{o(1)}$.

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) L Crude analysis: Sublattices eliminate the growth problem. Have practically unlimited supply of generalized congruences $(q-(n \mod q)) \frac{n+q-(n \mod q)}{q}$ between 0 and *n*.

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
- "Quadratic sieve" (QS) uses
- $i^2 n$ with $i \approx \sqrt{n}$; have $i^2 - n \approx n^{1/2 + o(1)}$,
- much smaller than *n*.
- "MPQS" improves o(1)using sublattices: $(i^2 - n)/c^2$ But still $\approx n^{1/2}$.
- "Number-field sieve" (NFS) achieves $n^{o(1)}$.

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Recall how the **Q** factors 611:

Form a square as product of $i(i - for several pairs (i - 14(625) \cdot 64(675)) = 4410000^2$.

 $gcd{611, 14 \cdot 64 \cdot 7}$ = 47. n. Jpply

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Generalizing beyond **Q**

Recall how the **Q** sieve

 $gcd{611, 14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75 - 4410}$

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The $\mathbf{Q}(\sqrt{14})$ sieve factors 611 as folle Form a square as product of (i + i)for several pairs (i $(-11 + 3 \cdot 25)(-1)$ (3+25)(3- $=(112-16\sqrt{14})^{2}$ Compute

- $s = (-11 + 3 \cdot 25)$ $t = 112 - 16 \cdot 25$,
- $gcd{611, s t} =$

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Compute $s = (-11 + 3 \cdot 25) \cdot (3 + 25)$ $t = 112 - 16 \cdot 25$, $gcd{611, s - t} = 13.$

The $\mathbf{Q}(\sqrt{14})$ sieve factors 611 as follows:

Form a square as product of (i + 25j)(i +for several pairs (*i*, *j*): $(-11 + 3 \cdot 25)(-11 + 3\sqrt{14})$ $(3+25)(3+\sqrt{14})$ $=(112-16\sqrt{14})^2.$

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
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Why do Answer: $Z[\sqrt{14}]$ since 25 Apply ri (-11 + $\cdot (3$ =(112 i.e. $s^2 =$ Unsurpri

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
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The $\mathbf{Q}(\sqrt{14})$ sieve

Compute

$$s = (-11 + 3 \cdot 25) \cdot (3 + 25),$$

 $t = 112 - 16 \cdot 25,$
 $gcd\{611, s - t\} = 13.$

)00}

Why does this work? Answer: Have ring morphism $\mathbf{Z}[\sqrt{14}] \rightarrow \mathbf{Z}/611, \sqrt{14} \mapsto 2$ since $25^2 = 14$ in **Z**/611. Apply ring morphism to squ $(-11 + 3 \cdot 25)(-11 + 3 \cdot 25)$ (3+25)(3+25) $= (112 - 16 \cdot 25)^2$ in **Z**/611 i.e. $s^2 = t^2$ in **Z**/611.

Unsurprising to find factor.

The $\mathbf{Q}(\sqrt{14})$ sieve factors 611 as follows:

Form a square
as product of
$$(i + 25j)(i + \sqrt{14}j)$$

for several pairs (i, j) :
 $(-11 + 3 \cdot 25)(-11 + 3\sqrt{14})$
 $\cdot (3 + 25)(3 + \sqrt{14})$
 $= (112 - 16\sqrt{14})^2$.

Compute

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 $t = 112 - 16 \cdot 25,$
 $gcd\{611, s - t\} = 13.$

Why does this work? Answer: Have ring morphism $\mathbf{Z}[\sqrt{14}] \rightarrow \mathbf{Z}/611, \sqrt{14} \mapsto 25,$ since $25^2 = 14$ in **Z**/611. Apply ring morphism to square: $(-11 + 3 \cdot 25)(-11 + 3 \cdot 25)$ (3+25)(3+25) $= (112 - 16 \cdot 25)^2$ in **Z**/611. i.e. $s^2 = t^2$ in **Z**/611.

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 $\sqrt{14}$) sieve 511 as follows:

square ict of $(i + 25j)(i + \sqrt{14}j)$ ral pairs (i, j): $(-11 + 3\sqrt{14})$ $(3+25)(3+\sqrt{14})$ $(-16\sqrt{14})^2$.

$$1 + 3 \cdot 25) \cdot (3 + 25),$$

- 16 \cdot 25,
, $s - t$ = 13.

Why does this work?

Answer: Have ring morphism $\mathbf{Z}[\sqrt{14}] \rightarrow \mathbf{Z}/611, \sqrt{14} \mapsto 25,$ since $25^2 = 14$ in **Z**/611.

Apply ring morphism to square: $(-11 + 3 \cdot 25)(-11 + 3 \cdot 25)$ (3+25)(3+25) $= (112 - 16 \cdot 25)^2$ in **Z**/611. i.e. $s^2 = t^2$ in **Z**/611.

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Generali to (*f*, *m* $m \in \mathbf{Z}$, Write *d* $f = f_d x$ Can take but large better p Pick $r \in$ Then f_d monic g $\mathbf{Q}(r) \leftarrow \mathbf{C}$

OWS:

$$(25j)(i + \sqrt{14}j)$$

(i):
 $(1 + 3\sqrt{14})$
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 $) \cdot (3 + 25),$

13.

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 $\sqrt{14}i$)

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Generalize from $(x^2 - 14, 25)$ to (f, m) with irred $f \in \mathbb{Z}[x]$ $m \in \mathbf{Z}, f(m) \in n\mathbf{Z}.$

Write $d = \deg f$, $f = f_d x^d + \dots + f_1 x^1 + f_0$

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Pick $r \in \mathbf{C}$, root of f. Then $f_d r$ is a root of monic $g = f_d^{d-1} f(x/f_d) \in \mathbb{Z}$ $\mathbf{Q}(r) \leftarrow \mathcal{O} \leftarrow \mathbf{Z}[f_d r] \xrightarrow{f_d r \mapsto f_d m}$ Why does this work?

Answer: Have ring morphism $\mathbf{Z}[\sqrt{14}] \rightarrow \mathbf{Z}/611, \sqrt{14} \mapsto 25,$ since $25^2 = 14$ in **Z**/611.

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es this work?

Have ring morphism $ightarrow \mathbf{Z}/611, \ \sqrt{14} \mapsto 25,$ $^{2} = 14$ in **Z**/611.

ng morphism to square: $(3 \cdot 25)(-11 + 3 \cdot 25)$ (3+25)(3+25) $(-16 \cdot 25)^2$ in **Z**/611.

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Build sq congrue with *i***Z** Could re higher-d quadrati for some But let's Say we l $||_{(i,j)\in S}$ in $\mathbf{Q}(r)$;

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Generalize from $(x^2 - 14, 25)$ to (f, m) with irred $f \in \mathbb{Z}[x]$, $m \in \mathbb{Z}$, $f(m) \in n\mathbb{Z}$.

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Build square in **Q** congruences (i - j)with $i\mathbf{Z} + j\mathbf{Z} = \mathbf{Z}$ Could replace i - jhigher-deg irred in quadratics seem fa for some number f But let's not both Say we have a squ $\prod_{(i,j)\in S}(i-jm)($ in $\mathbf{Q}(r)$; now what n 25,

are:

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Build square in $\mathbf{Q}(r)$ from congruences (i - jm)(i - jm)with $i\mathbf{Z} + j\mathbf{Z} = \mathbf{Z}$ and j > 0

- Could replace i jx by higher-deg irred in Z[x];
- quadratics seem fairly small
- for some number fields.
- But let's not bother.
- Say we have a square $\prod_{(i,j)\in S}(i-jm)(i-jr)$ in **Q**(r); now what?

Generalize from $(x^2 - 14, 25)$ to (f, m) with irred $f \in \mathbb{Z}[x]$, $m \in \mathbf{Z}, f(m) \in n\mathbf{Z}.$

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 $= \deg f$, $^{d} + \cdots + f_{1}x^{1} + f_{0}x^{0}$.

 $f_d = 1$ for simplicity, er f_d allows arameter selection.

C, root of
$$f$$
.
r is a root of
 $= f_d^{d-1} f(x/f_d) \in \mathbb{Z}[x].$
 $\mathcal{D} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}[f_d r] \xrightarrow{f_d r \mapsto f_d m} \mathbb{Z}/n$

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 $\prod (i-j)$ is a squa ring of i Multiply putting : compute $\prod (i-j)$ Then ap $\varphi : \mathbf{Z}[f_d]$ $f_d r$ to f $\varphi(r) - \xi$ In **Z**/*n* | $g'(f_dm)$

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 $f_1 x^1 + f_0 x^0$.


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of f. t of $(x/f_d) \in \mathbf{Z}[x].$ $\xrightarrow{f_d r \mapsto f_d m} \mathbf{Z}/n$ Build square in $\mathbf{Q}(r)$ from congruences (i - jm)(i - jr)with $i\mathbf{Z} + j\mathbf{Z} = \mathbf{Z}$ and j > 0. Could replace i - jx by higher-deg irred in $\mathbf{Z}[x]$; quadratics seem fairly small for some number fields. But let's not bother.

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iare (*i — j r*) t? $\Pi(i - jm)(i - jr)f_d^2$ is a square in \mathcal{O} , ring of integers of $\mathbf{Q}(r)$. Multiply by $g'(f_d r)^2$, putting square root into $\mathbf{Z}[f_d r]$: compute r with $r^2 = g'(f_d r)^2$. $\Pi(i - jm)(i - jr)f_d^2$.

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How to find squar of congruences (i Start with congrue e.g., y^2 pairs (i, j)Look for y-smooth y-smooth i - jmy-smooth f_d norm $f_d i^d + \cdots + f_0 j^d$ Norm covers all *d* Here "y-smooth" "has no prime divi Find enough smoc Perform linear algo exponent vectors i r)).

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Find enough smooth congru Perform linear algebra on exponent vectors mod 2.

How to find square product of congruences (i - jm)(i - jm)

Start with congruences for, e.g., y^2 pairs (i, j).

Look for y-smooth congruer y-smooth i - jm and

y-smooth $f_d \operatorname{norm}(i - jr) =$ $f_d i^d + \dots + f_0 j^d = j^d f(i/j)$

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m) $(i - jr)f_d^2$ are in \mathcal{O} , ntegers of $\mathbf{Q}(r)$.

by $g'(f_d r)^2$, square root into $\mathbf{Z}[f_d r]$: r with $r^2 = g'(f_d r)^2$. m) $(i - jr)f_d^2$.


ply the ring morphism $r] \rightarrow \mathbf{Z}/n$ taking f_dm . Compute gcd $\{n,$ $g'(f_d m) \prod (i - j m) f_d$. have $\varphi(r)^2 =$ $^{2}\prod(i-jm)^{2}f_{d}^{2}$.

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ing morphism taking pute gcd{n, $f(i - jm)f_d$ }. $f^2 = m)^2 f_d^2$.


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Polynomial selection

Many *f* 's possible How to find *f* tha minimizes NFS tin

General strategy: Enumerate many fFor each f, estimation about distribution of j^{deg} distribution of smoother



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Polynomial selection

- Many *f*'s possible for *n*.
- How to find *f* that
- minimizes NFS time?
- General strategy:
- Enumerate many f's.
- For each f, estimate time up
- information about f arithme
- distribution of $j^{\deg f} f(i/j)$,
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How to find square product of congruences (i - jm)(i - jr)?

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Let's restrict atter $(x-m)(f_5x^5+f_5)$ Take *m* near $n^{1/6}$ Expand *n* in base $n = f_5 m^5 + f_4 m^4$ Can use negative of Have $f_5 \approx n^{1/6}$. Typically all the f are on scale of n^{1} (1993 Buhler Lens

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Polynomial selection

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Let's restrict attention to f($(x-m)(f_5x^5+f_4x^4+\cdots)$


- Take *m* near $n^{1/6}$.
- Expand *n* in base *m*:
- $n = f_5 m^5 + f_4 m^4 + \cdots + n^4$
- Can use negative coefficient
- Have $f_5 \approx n^{1/6}$.
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Let's restrict attention to f(x) = $(x-m)(f_5x^5+f_4x^4+\cdots+f_0).$ Take *m* near $n^{1/6}$. Expand *n* in base *m*: $n = f_5 m^5 + f_4 m^4 + \dots + f_0.$ Can use negative coefficients. Have $f_5 \approx n^{1/6}$. Typically all the f_i 's are on scale of $n^{1/6}$. (1993 Buhler Lenstra Pomerance)



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To reduce Enumera for *m* ne Have f_5 f_4, f_3, f_2 as large Hope th on scale Conjecti within ro Then (*i* is on sca for i, j c Several

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To reduce f value Enumerate many for *m* near $B^{0.25}n$ Have $f_5 \approx B^{-1.25}$ f_4, f_3, f_2, f_1, f_0 co as large as $B^{0.25}n$ Hope that they ar on scale of $B^{-1.25}$ Conjecturally this within roughly B^7 Then $(i - jm)(f_5)$ is on scale of B^{-1} for *i*, *j* on scale of Several more ways

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Let's restrict attention to f(x) = $(x-m)(f_5x^5+f_4x^4+\cdots+f_0).$ Take *m* near $n^{1/6}$. Expand *n* in base *m*: $n = f_5 m^5 + f_4 m^4 + \cdots + f_0.$ Can use negative coefficients. Have $f_5 \approx n^{1/6}$. Typically all the f_i 's are on scale of $n^{1/6}$. (1993 Buhler Lenstra Pomerance)

To reduce f values by factor

- Enumerate many possibilitie for *m* near $B^{0.25}n^{1/6}$.
- Have $f_5 \approx B^{-1.25} n^{1/6}$.
- f_4, f_3, f_2, f_1, f_0 could be as large as $B^{0.25}n^{1/6}$.
- Hope that they are smaller, on scale of $B^{-1.25}n^{1/6}$.
- Conjecturally this happens within roughly $B^{7.5}$ trials. Then $(i - jm)(f_5i^5 + \cdots +$
- is on scale of $B^{-1}R^6n^{2/6}$
- for i, j on scale of R.
- Several more ways; depends

Let's restrict attention to f(x) = $(x-m)(f_5x^5+f_4x^4+\cdots+f_0).$ Take *m* near $n^{1/6}$. Expand *n* in base *m*: $n = f_5 m^5 + f_4 m^4 + \cdots + f_0.$ Can use negative coefficients. Have $f_5 \approx n^{1/6}$. Typically all the f_i 's are on scale of $n^{1/6}$.

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To reduce f values by factor B: Enumerate many possibilities for *m* near $B^{0.25}n^{1/6}$. Have $f_5 \approx B^{-1.25} n^{1/6}$ f_4, f_3, f_2, f_1, f_0 could be as large as $B^{0.25}n^{1/6}$. Hope that they are smaller, on scale of $B^{-1.25} n^{1/6}$. Conjecturally this happens within roughly $B^{7.5}$ trials.

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- Several more ways; depends on n.

strict attention to f(x) = $(f_5 x^5 + f_4 x^4 + \dots + f_0).$ near $n^{1/6}$. *n* in base *m*: $n^5 + f_4 m^4 + \cdots + f_0$

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Choose

- $d/(\log n)$
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tion to f(x) = 4x^4 + \cdots + f_0.
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Asymptotic cost e

Number of bit ope in number-field sie with theorists' par is $L^{1.90...+o(1)}$ whe $exp((\log n)^{1/3}(\log n))$ What are theorists Choose degree d v $d/(\log n)^{1/3}(\log \log n)$ $\in 1.40...+o(1).$

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Asymptotic cost exponents

- Number of bit operations
- in number-field sieve,
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- $\exp((\log n)^{1/3}(\log \log n)^{2/3})$
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Asymptotic cost exponents

Number of bit operations in number-field sieve, with theorists' parameters, is $L^{1.90...+o(1)}$ where L = $\exp((\log n)^{1/3}(\log \log n)^{2/3}).$ What are theorists' parameters? Choose degree d with $d/(\log n)^{1/3}(\log \log n)^{-1/3}$

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Number of bit operations in number-field sieve, with theorists' parameters, is $L^{1.90...+o(1)}$ where L = $\exp((\log n)^{1/3}(\log \log n)^{2/3})$. What are theorists' parameters?

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Choose integer *m* Write *n* as $m^{d} + f_{d-1}m^{d-1} +$ with each f_k below Choose f with sor in case there are b Test smoothness of for all coprime pai with $1 \leq i, j \leq L^0$ using primes $\leq L^0$ $L^{1.90...+o(1)}$ pairs. Conjecturally $L^{1.65}$ smooth values of

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Asymptotic cost exponents

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 $f_0 j^5$)

on *n*.

- Choose integer $m \approx n^{1/d}$.
- $m^{d} + f_{d-1}m^{d-1} + \cdots + f_{1}n^{d-1}$
- with each f_k below $n^{(1+o(1))}$
- Choose f with some random in case there are bad f's.
- Test smoothness of i jmfor all coprime pairs (*i*, *j*) with $1 \leq i, j \leq L^{0.95...+o(1)}$, using primes $\leq L^{0.95...+o(1)}$.
- $L^{1.90...+o(1)}$ pairs. Conjecturally $L^{1.65...+o(1)}$
- smooth values of i jm.

Asymptotic cost exponents

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<u>otic cost exponents</u>

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- orists' parameters, $L^{+o(1)}$ where L = $(\log \log n)^{2/3}$).
- e theorists' parameters?
- degree d with $)^{1/3} (\log \log n)^{-1/3}$..+o(1).

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For each (*i*, *j*) with smooth i - jtest smoothness o and $i - j\beta$ and so using primes $\leq L^0$ $L^{1.77...+o(1)}$ tests. Each $|j^d f(i/j)| \leq$ Conjecturally $L^{0.95}$ smooth congruence $L^{0.95...+o(1)}$ compo in the exponent ve

Choose integer $m \approx n^{1/d}$. Write *n* as $m^{d} + f_{d-1}m^{d-1} + \cdots + f_{1}m + f_{0}$ with each f_k below $n^{(1+o(1))/d}$. Choose *f* with some randomness in case there are bad f's. Test smoothness of i - jmfor all coprime pairs (*i*, *j*) with $1 \leq i, j \leq L^{0.95...+o(1)}$, using primes $< L^{0.95...+o(1)}$. $L^{1.90...+o(1)}$ pairs. Conjecturally $L^{1.65...+o(1)}$ smooth values of i - jm.

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Use $L^{0.12...+o(1)}$ number field

For each (i, j)with smooth i - j m, test smoothness of i - jrand $i - j\beta$ and so on, using primes $\leq L^{0.82...+o(1)}$. $L^{1.77...+o(1)}$ tests.

Each $|i^{d}f(i/i)| < m^{2.86...+6}$ Conjecturally $L^{0.95...+o(1)}$

smooth congruences.

 $L^{0.95...+o(1)}$ components in the exponent vectors.

Choose integer $m \approx n^{1/d}$. Write *n* as $m^{d} + f_{d-1}m^{d-1} + \cdots + f_{1}m + f_{0}$ with each f_k below $n^{(1+o(1))/d}$. Choose *f* with some randomness in case there are bad f's.

Test smoothness of i - jmfor all coprime pairs (*i*, *j*) with $1 \leq i, j \leq L^{0.95...+o(1)}$, using primes $< L^{0.95...+o(1)}$. $L^{1.90...+o(1)}$ pairs.

Conjecturally $L^{1.65...+o(1)}$ smooth values of i - jm. Use $L^{0.12...+o(1)}$ number fields.

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Use $L^{0.12...+o(1)}$ number fields. For each (i, j)with smooth i - jm, test smoothness of i - jrand $i - j\beta$ and so on, using primes $\leq L^{0.82...+o(1)}$. $L^{1.77...+o(1)}$ tests. Each $|i^d f(i/i)| < m^{2.86...+o(1)}$. Conjecturally $L^{0.95...+o(1)}$ smooth congruences. $L^{0.95...+o(1)}$ components in the exponent vectors.

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Use $L^{0.12...+o(1)}$ number fields. For each (*i*, *j*) with smooth i - jm, test smoothness of i - jrand $i - j\beta$ and so on, using primes $\leq L^{0.82...+o(1)}$. $L^{1.77...+o(1)}$ tests. Each $|i^d f(i/i)| < m^{2.86...+o(1)}$. Conjecturally $L^{0.95...+o(1)}$ smooth congruences. $L^{0.95...+o(1)}$ components in the exponent vectors.

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Use $L^{0.12...+o(1)}$ number fields. For each (*i*, *j*) with smooth i - jm, test smoothness of i - jrand $i - j\beta$ and so on, using primes $< L^{0.82...+o(1)}$. $I^{1.77...+o(1)}$ tests. Each $|i^d f(i/i)| < m^{2.86...+o(1)}$. Conjecturally $L^{0.95...+o(1)}$ smooth congruences. $L^{0.95...+o(1)}$ components in the exponent vectors.

Three sizes of numbers here $(\log n)^{1/3} (\log \log n)^{2/3}$ bits: y, *i*, *j*. $(\log n)^{2/3} (\log \log n)^{1/3}$ bits: $m, i - jm, j^d f(i/j).$ log *n* bits: *n*. Unavoidably 1/3 in exponent usual smoothness optimizati forces $(\log y)^2 \approx \log m$; balancing norms with m forces $d \log y \approx \log m$; and $d \log m \approx \log n$.

Use $L^{0.12...+o(1)}$ number fields.

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 $L^{0.95...+o(1)}$ components in the exponent vectors.

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Three sizes of numbers here: $(\log n)^{1/3} (\log \log n)^{2/3}$ bits: y, i, j. $(\log n)^{2/3} (\log \log n)^{1/3}$ bits: $m, i - jm, j^d f(i/j).$ log *n* bits: *n*.

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Batch NFS

The number-field $L^{1.90...+o(1)}$ bit op

finding smooth $i - L^{1.77...+o(1)}$ bit op finding smooth j^d

Many *n*'s can share $L^{1.90...+o(1)}$ bit op

to find squares for

Oops, linear algebraic fix by reducing y. But still end up fa batch in much less factoring each n s ds.

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Three sizes of numbers here: $(\log n)^{1/3} (\log \log n)^{2/3}$ bits: y, i, j. $(\log n)^{2/3} (\log \log n)^{1/3}$ bits: $m, i - jm, j^d f(i/j).$

log *n* bits: *n*.

Unavoidably 1/3 in exponent: usual smoothness optimization forces $(\log y)^2 \approx \log m$; balancing norms with m forces $d \log y \approx \log m$; and $d \log m \approx \log n$.

Batch NFS

The number-field sieve used $L^{1.90...+o(1)}$ bit operations finding smooth i - j m; only $L^{1.77...+o(1)}$ bit operations finding smooth $j^d f(i/j)$.

Many *n*'s can share one *m*; $L^{1.90...+o(1)}$ bit operations to find squares for all n's.

- Oops, linear algebra hurts;
- fix by reducing y.
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- factoring each *n* separately.

Three sizes of numbers here: $(\log n)^{1/3} (\log \log n)^{2/3}$ bits: у, і, ј. $(\log n)^{2/3} (\log \log n)^{1/3}$ bits: $m, i - jm, j^d f(i/j).$ log *n* bits: *n*. Unavoidably 1/3 in exponent: usual smoothness optimization

forces $(\log y)^2 \approx \log m$; balancing norms with mforces $d \log y \approx \log m$; and $d \log m \approx \log n$.

Batch NFS

The number-field sieve used $L^{1.90...+o(1)}$ bit operations finding smooth i - jm; only $L^{1.77...+o(1)}$ bit operations finding smooth $j^d f(i/j)$. Many *n*'s can share one *m*; $L^{1.90...+o(1)}$ bit operations to find squares for all n's. Oops, linear algebra hurts; fix by reducing y. But still end up factoring batch in much less time than factoring each *n* separately.

zes of numbers here:

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 $^{/3}(\log \log n)^{1/3}$ bits: $m, j^d f(i/j).$

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ably 1/3 in exponent: noothness optimization $(\log y)^2 \approx \log m;$ g norms with m $\log y \approx \log m$; $g m \approx \log n$.

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Oops, linear algebra hurts; fix by reducing y. But still end up factoring batch in much less time than factoring each *n* separately.

Asympto paramet $d/(\log n)$ $\in 1.10$. Primes $1 \leq i, j$ Comput finds L^{1} smooth **1**.64...+

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Batch NFS

The number-field sieve used $L^{1.90...+o(1)}$ bit operations finding smooth i - jm; only $L^{1.77...+o(1)}$ bit operations finding smooth $j^d f(i/j)$.

Many *n*'s can share one *m*; $L^{1.90...+o(1)}$ bit operations to find squares for *all n*'s.

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Asymptotic batchparameters: $d/(\log n)^{1/3}(\log \log n)$ $\in 1.10...+o(1).$ Primes < $L^{0.82...+}$ $1 \le i, j \le L^{1.00...+}$ Computation inde finds $L^{1.64...+o(1)}$ smooth values i – $L^{1.64...+o(1)}$ operate for each target *n*.

Batch NFS

The number-field sieve used $L^{1.90...+o(1)}$ bit operations finding smooth i - jm; only $L^{1.77...+o(1)}$ bit operations finding smooth $j^d f(i/j)$.

Many *n*'s can share one *m*; $L^{1.90...+o(1)}$ bit operations to find squares for all n's.

Oops, linear algebra hurts; fix by reducing y. But still end up factoring batch in much less time than factoring each *n* separately.

Asymptotic batch-NFS parameters: $d/(\log n)^{1/3}(\log \log n)^{-1/3}$ $\in 1.10...+o(1).$ Primes $< L^{0.82...+o(1)}$. $1 \leq i, j \leq L^{1.00...+o(1)}$. Computation independent of finds $L^{1.64...+o(1)}$ smooth values i - jm. $L^{1.64...+o(1)}$ operations for each target *n*.

Batch NFS

The number-field sieve used $L^{1.90...+o(1)}$ bit operations finding smooth i - jm; only $L^{1.77...+o(1)}$ bit operations finding smooth $j^d f(i/j)$.

Many *n*'s can share one *m*; $L^{1.90...+o(1)}$ bit operations to find squares for all n's.

Oops, linear algebra hurts; fix by reducing y. But still end up factoring batch in much less time than factoring each *n* separately.

Asymptotic batch-NFS parameters: $d/(\log n)^{1/3}(\log \log n)^{-1/3}$ $\in 1.10...+o(1).$ Primes $< L^{0.82...+o(1)}$. $1 \leq i, j \leq L^{1.00...+o(1)}$. Computation independent of *n* finds $L^{1.64...+o(1)}$ smooth values i - jm. $L^{1.64...+o(1)}$ operations for each target *n*.

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
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- end up factoring
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Asymptotic batch-NFS parameters: $d/(\log n)^{1/3}(\log \log n)^{-1/3}$ $\in 1.10...+o(1).$ Primes $< L^{0.82...+o(1)}$. $1 \leq i, j \leq L^{1.00...+o(1)}$.

Computation independent of *n* finds $L^{1.64...+o(1)}$ smooth values i - j m. $L^{1.64...+o(1)}$ operations for each target *n*.



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Asymptotic batch-NFS parameters: $d/(\log n)^{1/3}(\log \log n)^{-1/3}$ $\in 1.10...+o(1).$ Primes < $L^{0.82...+o(1)}$. $1 \leq i, j \leq L^{1.00...+o(1)}$. Computation independent of *n* finds $L^{1.64...+o(1)}$ smooth values i - jm. $L^{1.64...+o(1)}$ operations for each target *n*.

Batch NFS for RS


Expand *n* in base

 $n = n_7 m^7 + n_6 m$ with $0 \le n_0, n_1$,

Assume irreducibil $n_7 x^7 + n_6 x^6 + \cdots$

Choose height H =consider pairs (*a*, *i*) that $-H \le a \le H$ and gcd{*a*, *b*} = 1

Choose smoothnes $y = 2^{66} + 2^{55}$.



Batch NFS for RSA-3072

- Expand *n* in base $m = 2^{384}$ $n = n_7 m^7 + n_6 m^6 + \cdots +$
- with $0 \le n_0, n_1, ..., n_7 < n_7$
- Assume irreducibility of $n_7 x^7 + n_6 x^6 + \cdots + n_0$.
- Choose height $H = 2^{62} + 2^{61}$ consider pairs $(a, b) \in \mathbf{Z} \times \mathbf{Z}$ that -H < a < H, 0 < b < d
- Choose smoothness bound $y = 2^{66} + 2^{55}$.

Asymptotic batch-NFS parameters:

$$d/(\log n)^{1/3} (\log \log n)^{-1/3}$$

 $\in 1.10 \dots + o(1).$
Primes $\leq L^{0.82\dots + o(1)}.$
 $1 \leq i, j \leq L^{1.00\dots + o(1)}.$

Computation independent of *n* finds $L^{1.64...+o(1)}$ smooth values i - jm.

 $L^{1.64...+o(1)}$ operations for each target *n*.

Batch NFS for RSA-3072

Expand *n* in base $m = 2^{384}$: $n = n_7 m^7 + n_6 m^6 + \cdots + n_0$ with $0 \le n_0, n_1, ..., n_7 < m$.

Assume irreducibility of $n_7 x^7 + n_6 x^6 + \cdots + n_0$.

that -H < a < H, 0 < b < H, and $gcd{a, b} = 1$.

Choose smoothness bound $v = 2^{66} + 2^{55}$.

- Choose height $H = 2^{62} + 2^{61} + 2^{57}$: consider pairs $(a, b) \in \mathbf{Z} \times \mathbf{Z}$ such

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ers:

$$)^{1/3} (\log \log n)^{-1/3}$$

...+ $o(1)$.
 $\leq L^{0.82...+o(1)}$.

$$\leq L^{1.00...+o(1)}$$

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
Batch NFS for RSA-3072

Expand *n* in base $m = 2^{384}$: $n = n_7 m^7 + n_6 m^6 + \cdots + n_0$ with $0 \le n_0, n_1, ..., n_7 < m$.

Assume irreducibility of $n_7 x^7 + n_6 x^6 + \cdots + n_0$.

Choose height $H = 2^{62} + 2^{61} + 2^{57}$: consider pairs $(a, b) \in \mathbf{Z} \times \mathbf{Z}$ such that $-H \leq a \leq H$, $0 < b \leq H$, and $gcd{a, b} = 1$.

Choose smoothness bound $y = 2^{66} + 2^{55}$.



There an $12H^{2}/\pi$ pairs (a, Find all y-smoot $c = n_7 a$ Combine into a fa if there Number $\approx 2y/\log$

NFS

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Batch NFS for RSA-3072

Expand *n* in base $m = 2^{384}$: $n = n_7 m^7 + n_6 m^6 + \cdots + n_0$ with $0 \le n_0, n_1, \ldots, n_7 < m$.

Assume irreducibility of $n_7 x^7 + n_6 x^6 + \cdots + n_0$.

Choose height $H = 2^{62} + 2^{61} + 2^{57}$: consider pairs $(a, b) \in \mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z}$ such that $-H \leq a \leq H$, $0 < b \leq H$, and $gcd\{a, b\} = 1$.

Choose smoothness bound $y = 2^{66} + 2^{55}$.

There are about $12H^2/\pi^2 \approx 2^{125.5}$ pairs (*a*, *b*).

Find all pairs (*a*, *b y*-smooth (*a* - *bm*) $c = n_7 a^7 + n_6 a^6 b$

Combine these con into a factorization if there are enough

Number of congru $\approx 2y/\log y \approx 2^{62}$.

Batch NFS for RSA-3072 Expand *n* in base $m = 2^{384}$: $n = n_7 m^7 + n_6 m^6 + \cdots + n_0$ with $0 < n_0, n_1, \ldots, n_7 < m$. Assume irreducibility of $n_7 x^7 + n_6 x^6 + \cdots + n_0$. Choose height $H = 2^{62} + 2^{61} + 2^{57}$: consider pairs $(a, b) \in \mathbf{Z} \times \mathbf{Z}$ such that -H < a < H, 0 < b < H, and $gcd{a, b} = 1$.

Choose smoothness bound $y = 2^{66} + 2^{55}$.

pairs (a, b).

There are about $12H^2/\pi^2 \approx 2^{125.51}$

Find all pairs (*a*, *b*) with y-smooth (a - bm)c where $c = n_7 a^7 + n_6 a^6 b + \cdots + n_6 a^6 b + \cdots$

Combine these congruences into a factorization of *n*,

if there are enough congruer

Number of congruences nee $\approx 2y/\log y \approx 2^{62.06}$.

Batch NFS for RSA-3072

Expand *n* in base $m = 2^{384}$: $n = n_7 m^7 + n_6 m^6 + \cdots + n_0$ with $0 < n_0, n_1, \ldots, n_7 < m$.

Assume irreducibility of $n_7 x^7 + n_6 x^6 + \cdots + n_0$.

Choose height $H = 2^{62} + 2^{61} + 2^{57}$: consider pairs $(a, b) \in \mathbf{Z} \times \mathbf{Z}$ such that -H < a < H, 0 < b < H, and $gcd\{a, b\} = 1$.

Choose smoothness bound $v = 2^{66} + 2^{55}$.

There are about $12H^2/\pi^2 \approx 2^{125.51}$ pairs (a, b).

Find all pairs (*a*, *b*) with y-smooth (a - bm)c where $c = n_7 a^7 + n_6 a^6 b + \cdots + n_0 b^7$.

Combine these congruences into a factorization of *n*, if there are enough congruences.

Number of congruences needed $\approx 2y/\log y \approx 2^{62.06}$.

FS for RSA-3072

$$n \text{ in base } m = 2^{384}$$
:
 $m^7 + n_6 m^6 + \cdots + n_0$
 $\sum_{n=0}^{\infty} n_1, \ldots, n_7 < m$.

irreducibility of $n_6 x^6 + \cdots + n_0$.

height $H = 2^{62} + 2^{61} + 2^{57}$: pairs $(a, b) \in \mathbf{Z} \times \mathbf{Z}$ such $I \leq a \leq H$, $0 < b \leq H$, $\{a, b\} = 1.$

smoothness bound $+2^{55}$.

There are about $12H^2/\pi^2 \approx 2^{125.51}$ pairs (a, b).

Find all pairs (*a*, *b*) with y-smooth (a - bm)c where $c = n_7 a^7 + n_6 a^6 b + \cdots + n_0 b^7$.

Combine these congruences into a factorization of *n*, if there are enough congruences.

Number of congruences needed $\approx 2y/\log y \approx 2^{62.06}$.

Heuristie a - bmchance a integer i and this where *u* Have *u* and $u^{-\iota}$ so there $2^{107.09}$ r such that

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 $.., n_7 < m$.

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 $= 2^{62} + 2^{61} + 2^{57}$: b) $\in \mathbf{Z} \times \mathbf{Z}$ such b) $0 < b \le H$,

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Heuristic approxim *a* – *bm* has same chance as a unifor integer in [1, Hm] and this chance is where $u = (\log(H))$ Have $u \approx 6.707$ and $u^{-u} \approx 2^{-18.4}$ so there are about 2^{107.09} pairs (*a*, *b*) such that a - bm

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There are about $12H^2/\pi^2 \approx 2^{125.51}$ pairs (a, b). Find all pairs (*a*, *b*) with y-smooth (a - bm)c where $c = n_7 a^7 + n_6 a^6 b + \cdots + n_0 b^7$. Combine these congruences into a factorization of *n*, if there are enough congruences. Number of congruences needed

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integer in [1, Hm], and $u^{-u} \approx 2^{-18.42}$,

- Heuristic approximation:
- a bm has same y-smooth
- chance as a uniform random
- and this chance is u^{-u}
- where $u = (\log(Hm)) / \log y$
- Have $u \approx 6.707$
- so there are about
- 2^{107.09} pairs (*a*, *b*)
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- 2^{107.09} pairs (*a*, *b*)

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Heuristic approximation:

a - bm has same y-smoothness chance as a uniform random integer in [1, Hm], and this chance is u^{-u} where $u = (\log(Hm))/\log y$.

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Heuristic approxim c has same y-smo as a uniform rando $[1, 8H^7m],$ and this chance is where $v = (\log(8h))$ Have $v \approx 12.395$ and $v^{-v} \approx 2^{-45.02}$ so there are about 2^{62.08} pairs (*a*, *b*) a - bm and c are Safely above 2^{62.0}

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Heuristic approximation: *a* – *bm* has same *y*-smoothness chance as a uniform random $[1, 8H^7m],$ integer in [1, Hm], and this chance is u^{-u} where $u = (\log(Hm)) / \log y$. Have $u \approx 6.707$ and $u^{-u} \approx 2^{-18.42}$, so there are about 2^{107.09} pairs (*a*, *b*) such that a - bm is smooth.

- Heuristic approximation:
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- as a uniform random integer
- and this chance is v^{-v}
- where $v = (\log(8H^7m))/\log(8H^7m))$
- Have $v \approx 12.395$
- and $v^{-v} \approx 2^{-45.01}$,
- so there are about
- $2^{62.08}$ pairs (*a*, *b*) such that
- a bm and c are both smoother
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Heuristic approximation:

a – *bm* has same *y*-smoothness chance as a uniform random integer in [1, Hm], and this chance is u^{-u} where $u = (\log(Hm)) / \log y$. Have $u \approx 6.707$ and $u^{-u} \approx 2^{-18.42}$. so there are about $2^{107.09}$ pairs (*a*, *b*) such that a - bm is smooth.

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- c approximation:
- has same *y*-smoothness as a uniform random n [1, *Hm*],
- chance is u^{-u}
- $= (\log(Hm)) / \log y.$
- ≈ 6.707 $'pprox 2^{-18.42}$,
- are about
- bairs (*a*, *b*)
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Heuristic approximation: c has same y-smoothness chance as a uniform random integer in $[1, 8H^7m],$ and this chance is v^{-v} where $v = (\log(8H^7m)) / \log y$. Have $v \approx 12.395$ and $v^{-v} \approx 2^{-45.01}$, so there are about $2^{62.08}$ pairs (*a*, *b*) such that a - bm and c are both smooth. Safely above $2^{62.06}$.

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Biggest step in computation Check $2^{125.51}$ pairs (*a*, *b*) to find the $2^{107.09}$ pairs

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- c approximation:
- me y-smoothness chance form random integer in n],
- chance is v^{-v}
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Biggest step in computation: Check $2^{125.51}$ pairs (*a*, *b*) to find the $2^{107.09}$ pairs where *a* – *bm* is smooth.

This step is independent of N, reused by many integers N.

Biggest step depending on N: Check $2^{107.09}$ pairs (*a*, *b*) to see whether *c* is smooth.

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Most of them covered in http://facthacks.cr.yp.to/

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The rho Define ρ Every pr $(\rho_1 - \rho_2)$ $\cdots (\rho_{357})$ Also ma Can con $pprox 2^{14}$ m very littl Compare for trial

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<u>The rho method</u>

Define $\rho_0 = 0$, ρ_{k-1} Every prime $\leq 2^{20}$ $(\rho_1 - \rho_2)(\rho_2 - \rho_4)$ $\cdots (\rho_{3575} - \rho_{7150})$ Also many larger p

Can compute gcd $\approx 2^{14}$ multiplication very little memory.

Compare to $\approx 2^{16}$

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The rho method

- Define $\rho_0 = 0$, $\rho_{k+1} = \rho_k^2 +$
- Every prime $\leq 2^{20}$ divides S
- $(\rho_1 \rho_2)(\rho_2 \rho_4)(\rho_3 \rho_6)$
- $\cdots (\rho_{3575} \rho_{7150}).$
- Also many larger primes.
- Can compute $gcd\{c, S\}$ usir $pprox 2^{14}$ multiplications mod c very little memory.
- Compare to $\approx 2^{16}$ divisions for trial division up to 2^{20} .

The $2^{107.09}$ pairs (*a*, *b*) are not consecutive, so no easy way to sieve for prime divisors of c.

Fix: factor each number separately:

start with trial division,

then Pollard rho,

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Most of them covered in http://facthacks.cr.yp.to/ The rho method

Define $\rho_0 = 0$, $\rho_{k+1} = \rho_k^2 + 11$. Every prime $\leq 2^{20}$ divides S = $(\rho_1 - \rho_2)(\rho_2 - \rho_4)(\rho_3 - \rho_6)$ $\cdots (\rho_{3575} - \rho_{7150}).$ Also many larger primes. Can compute $gcd{c, S}$ using

 $\approx 2^{14}$ multiplications mod *c*, very little memory.

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Can compute $gcd{c, S}$ using $\approx 2^{14}$ multiplications mod *c*, very little memory.

Compare to $\approx 2^{16}$ divisions for trial division up to 2^{20} .

More ge Compute $(\rho_1 - \rho_2)$ How big for all pi Plausible so $y^{1/2+}$ Reason: $\rho_1 \mod \mu$

If ρ_i mod then ρ_k for $k \in ($ (a, b) e, sieve of *c*. umber ision, ered in r.yp.to/

The rho method

Define $\rho_0 = 0$, $\rho_{k+1} = \rho_k^2 + 11$. Every prime $\leq 2^{20}$ divides $S = (\rho_1 - \rho_2)(\rho_2 - \rho_4)(\rho_3 - \rho_6)$ $\cdots (\rho_{3575} - \rho_{7150})$. Also many larger primes. Can compute $gcd\{c, S\}$ using

Can compute $gcd\{c, S\}$ using $\approx 2^{14}$ multiplications mod *c*, very little memory.

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More generally: C Compute gcd{*c*, *S* $(
ho_1ho_2)(
ho_2ho_4$ How big does z ha for all primes $\leq y$ Plausible conjectu so $v^{1/2+o(1)}$ mults Reason: Consider $\rho_1 \mod p, \rho_2 \mod p$ If $\rho_i \mod p = \rho_i \mod p$ then $\rho_k \mod p = \rho$ for $k \in (j - i) \mathbf{Z} \cap$ The rho method

Define
$$\rho_0 = 0$$
, $\rho_{k+1} = \rho_k^2 + 11$.
Every prime $\leq 2^{20}$ divides $S = (\rho_1 - \rho_2)(\rho_2 - \rho_4)(\rho_3 - \rho_6)$ $\cdots (\rho_{3575} - \rho_{7150})$.
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Can compute $gcd{c, S}$ using $\approx 2^{14}$ multiplications mod *c*, very little memory.

Compare to $\approx 2^{16}$ divisions for trial division up to 2^{20} .

More generally: Choose z. Compute $gcd{c, S}$ where S $(\rho_1 - \rho_2)(\rho_2 - \rho_4) \cdots (\rho_z - \rho_z)$

- How big does z have to be for all primes $\leq y$ to divide
- Plausible conjecture: $y^{1/2+\alpha}$ so $v^{1/2+o(1)}$ mults mod c.
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- $\rho_1 \mod p, \rho_2 \mod p, \ldots$
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- for $k \in (j i) \mathbb{Z} \cap [i, \infty] \cap [i]$

The rho method

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Reason: Consider first collision in $\rho_1 \mod p, \rho_2 \mod p, \ldots$ If $\rho_i \mod p = \rho_i \mod p$ then $\rho_k \mod p = \rho_{2k} \mod p$ for $k \in (j - i) \mathbb{Z} \cap [i, \infty] \cap [j, \infty]$.

<u>The p –</u> $S_1 = 2^2$ divisors 3, 5, 7, 37, 41, 4 89, 97, 2 137, 151 These d 70 of th 156 of t 296 of t 470 of t etc.

 $\rho_{+1} = \rho_k^2 + 11.$ divides $S = (\rho_3 - \rho_6)$

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More generally: Choose z. Compute $gcd{c, S}$ where S = $(\rho_1 - \rho_2)(\rho_2 - \rho_4) \cdots (\rho_z - \rho_{2z}).$ How big does z have to be for all primes $\leq y$ to divide S? Plausible conjecture: $y^{1/2+o(1)}$; so $v^{1/2+o(1)}$ mults mod c. Reason: Consider first collision in $\rho_1 \mod p, \rho_2 \mod p, \ldots$ If $\rho_i \mod p = \rho_i \mod p$ then $\rho_k \mod p = \rho_{2k} \mod p$ for $k \in (j - i) \mathbb{Z} \cap [i, \infty] \cap [j, \infty]$.

The p-1 method

 $S_1 = 2^{232792560}$ - divisors

3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17 37, 41, 43, 53, 61,

89, 97, 103, 109, 1 137, 151, 157, 181

These divisors incl 70 of the 168 prim 156 of the 1229 pr 296 of the 9592 pr 470 of the 78498

etc.

More generally: Choose z. Compute $gcd{c, S}$ where S = $(\rho_1 - \rho_2)(\rho_2 - \rho_4) \cdots (\rho_z - \rho_{2z}).$ How big does z have to be for all primes $\leq y$ to divide S? Plausible conjecture: $y^{1/2+o(1)}$; so $v^{1/2+o(1)}$ mults mod c. Reason: Consider first collision in $\rho_1 \mod p, \rho_2 \mod p, \ldots$ If $\rho_i \mod p = \rho_i \mod p$ then $\rho_k \mod p = \rho_{2k} \mod p$ for $k \in (j - i) \mathbb{Z} \cap [i, \infty] \cap [j, \infty]$.

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<u>The p-1 method</u> $S_1 = 2^{232792560} - 1$ has pr divisors 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 2 37, 41, 43, 53, 61, 67, 71, 7 89, 97, 103, 109, 113, 127, 137, 151, 157, 181, 191, 199 These divisors include 70 of the 168 primes $\leq 10^3$; 156 of the 1229 primes \leq 10 296 of the 9592 primes \leq 10 470 of the 78498 primes ≤ 1 etc.

More generally: Choose z. Compute $gcd{c, S}$ where S = $(\rho_1 - \rho_2)(\rho_2 - \rho_4) \cdots (\rho_z - \rho_{2z}).$

How big does z have to be for all primes $\leq y$ to divide S?

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Reason: Consider first collision in $\rho_1 \mod p, \rho_2 \mod p, \ldots$ If $\rho_i \mod p = \rho_i \mod p$ then $\rho_k \mod p = \rho_{2k} \mod p$ for $k \in (j - i) \mathbb{Z} \cap [i, \infty] \cap [j, \infty]$.

The p-1 method $S_1 = 2^{232792560} - 1$ has prime divisors 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31, 37, 41, 43, 53, 61, 67, 71, 73, 79, 89, 97, 103, 109, 113, 127, 131, 137, 151, 157, 181, 191, 199 etc. These divisors include 70 of the 168 primes $\leq 10^3$; 156 of the 1229 primes $\leq 10^4$; 296 of the 9592 primes $\le 10^5$; 470 of the 78498 primes $< 10^{6}$; etc.

nerally: Choose z. e gcd{c, S} where S = $(\rho_2 - \rho_4) \cdots (\rho_z - \rho_{2z}).$

does z have to be rimes $\leq y$ to divide S?

e conjecture: $y^{1/2+o(1)}$; -o(1) mults mod c.

Consider first collision in ρ , $\rho_2 \mod p$,

 $d p = \rho_i \mod p$

 $\operatorname{mod} p = \rho_{2k} \operatorname{mod} p$

 $(j-i)\mathbf{Z} \cap [i,\infty] \cap [j,\infty].$

The p-1 method $S_1 = 2^{232792560} - 1$ has prime divisors 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31, 37, 41, 43, 53, 61, 67, 71, 73, 79, 89, 97, 103, 109, 113, 127, 131, 137, 151, 157, 181, 191, 199 etc.

These divisors include 70 of the 168 primes $\leq 10^3$; 156 of the 1229 primes $\leq 10^4$; 296 of the 9592 primes $\leq 10^{5}$; 470 of the 78498 primes $\leq 10^{6}$; etc.

An odd divides 2 iff order multiplic divides s Many w 2327925 Why so Answer: $= \operatorname{Icm} \{1$ $= 2^4 \cdot 3^2$

hoose z. } where S =) $\cdots (\rho_z - \rho_{2z})$. ave to be to divide S? re: $y^{1/2+o(1)}$; 5 mod c.

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 $\operatorname{od} p$

 $p_{2k} \mod p$

 $[i,\infty]\cap [j,\infty].$

<u>The p-1 method</u>

 $S_1 = 2^{232792560} - 1$ has prime divisors

3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31, 37, 41, 43, 53, 61, 67, 71, 73, 79, 89, 97, 103, 109, 113, 127, 131, 137, 151, 157, 181, 191, 199 etc.

These divisors include 70 of the 168 primes $\leq 10^3$; 156 of the 1229 primes $\leq 10^4$; 296 of the 9592 primes $\leq 10^5$; 470 of the 78498 primes $\leq 10^6$; etc. An odd prime pdivides $2^{232792560}$ iff order of 2 in th multiplicative grou divides s = 232792

Many ways for this 232792560 has 96

Why so many? Answer: s = 2327 $= lcm\{1, 2, 3, 4, 5,$ $= 2^4 \cdot 3^2 \cdot 5 \cdot 7 \cdot 11$ $\rho_{2z}).$

S? (1);

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j, ∞].

etc.

The p-1 method $S_1 = 2^{232792560} - 1$ has prime divisors 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31, 37, 41, 43, 53, 61, 67, 71, 73, 79, 89, 97, 103, 109, 113, 127, 131, 137, 151, 157, 181, 191, 199 etc. These divisors include 70 of the 168 primes $\leq 10^3$; 156 of the 1229 primes $\le 10^4$;

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An odd prime *p* divides $2^{232792560} - 1$ iff order of 2 in the multiplicative group \mathbf{F}_{p}^{*} divides *s* = 232792560.

Many ways for this to happe 232792560 has 960 divisors.

Why so many? Answer: *s* = 232792560 $= \operatorname{lcm}\{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, \ldots, 20\}$ $= 2^4 \cdot 3^2 \cdot 5 \cdot 7 \cdot 11 \cdot 13 \cdot 17 \cdot$

The p-1 method

 $S_1 = 2^{232792560} - 1$ has prime divisors

3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31, 37, 41, 43, 53, 61, 67, 71, 73, 79, 89, 97, 103, 109, 113, 127, 131, 137, 151, 157, 181, 191, 199 etc.

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An odd prime p divides $2^{232792560} - 1$ iff order of 2 in the multiplicative group \mathbf{F}_{p}^{*} divides *s* = 232792560. Many ways for this to happen: 232792560 has 960 divisors.

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- $= 2^4 \cdot 3^2 \cdot 5 \cdot 7 \cdot 11 \cdot 13 \cdot 17 \cdot 19.$

1 method

²³²⁷⁹²⁵⁶⁰ – 1 has prime

11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31, 43, 53, 61, 67, 71, 73, 79, 103, 109, 113, 127, 131, ., 157, 181, 191, 199 etc.

ivisors include

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 $= 2^4 \cdot 3^2 \cdot 5 \cdot 7 \cdot 11 \cdot 13 \cdot 17 \cdot 19.$

Can con using 41 (Side no Ring ope This cor $2^2 = 2 \cdot 1^2$ $2^{12} = 2^6$ $2^{55}: 2^{110}$ 2^{3552} ; 2^7 $2^{56834} \cdot 2^{1}$ 2^{909345} ; 2³⁶³⁷³⁸³ $2^{1454953}$ $2^{11639623}$

- 1 has prime

, 19, 23, 29, 31, , 67, 71, 73, 79, 113, 127, 131, L, 191, 199 etc.

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rimes \leq 10^4;
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An odd prime pdivides $2^{232792560} - 1$ iff order of 2 in the multiplicative group \mathbf{F}_p^* divides s = 232792560.

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Why so many? Answer: s = 232792560 $= lcm\{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, ..., 20\}$ $= 2^4 \cdot 3^2 \cdot 5 \cdot 7 \cdot 11 \cdot 13 \cdot 17 \cdot 19.$

Can compute 2²³² using 41 ring oper (Side note: 41 is r Ring operation: 0 This computation: $2^2 = 2 \cdot 2; \ 2^3 = 2^2$ $2^{12} = 2^6 \cdot 2^6 : 2^{13} =$ 2⁵⁵; 2¹¹⁰; 2¹¹¹; 2²² 2^{3552} ; 2^{7104} ; 2^{14208} 256834.2113668.2227 2⁹⁰⁹³⁴⁵; 2¹⁸¹⁸⁶⁹⁰; 2 2³⁶³⁷³⁸³; 2⁷²⁷⁴⁷⁶⁶; $2^{14549535}$: $2^{2909907}$ 2¹¹⁶³⁹⁶²⁸⁰: 2²³²⁷⁹²

ime

29, 31, 3, 79, 131,

9 etc.

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)<sup>4</sup>;
)<sup>5</sup>;
10<sup>6</sup>;
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An odd prime *p* divides $2^{232792560} - 1$ iff order of 2 in the multiplicative group \mathbf{F}_{p}^{*} divides *s* = 232792560.

Many ways for this to happen: 232792560 has 960 divisors.

Why so many? Answer: *s* = 232792560 $= \operatorname{lcm}\{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, \dots, 20\}$ $= 2^4 \cdot 3^2 \cdot 5 \cdot 7 \cdot 11 \cdot 13 \cdot 17 \cdot 19.$

Can compute $2^{232792560} - 1$ using 41 ring operations. (Side note: 41 is not minim Ring operation: 0, 1, +, -, This computation: 1; 2 = 1 $2^2 = 2 \cdot 2; \ 2^3 = 2^2 \cdot 2; \ 2^6 =$ $2^{12} = 2^6 \cdot 2^6$; $2^{13} = 2^{12} \cdot 2$; 2^{26} ; 2⁵⁵; 2¹¹⁰; 2¹¹¹; 2²²²; 2⁴⁴⁴; 2⁸⁸ 2³⁵⁵²; 2⁷¹⁰⁴; 2¹⁴²⁰⁸; 2²⁸⁴¹⁶; 2 256834.2113668.2227336.2454672 2909345; 21818690; 21818691; 23 23637383; 27274766; 27274767; 2 2¹⁴⁵⁴⁹⁵³⁵: 2²⁹⁰⁹⁹⁰⁷⁰: 2⁵⁸¹⁹⁸¹⁴ 2116396280: 2232792560: 223279

An odd prime pdivides $2^{232792560} - 1$ iff order of 2 in the multiplicative group \mathbf{F}_p^* divides s = 232792560.

Many ways for this to happen: 232792560 has 960 divisors.

Why so many? Answer: s = 232792560= lcm{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, ..., 20} = $2^4 \cdot 3^2 \cdot 5 \cdot 7 \cdot 11 \cdot 13 \cdot 17 \cdot 19.$

Can compute $2^{232792560} - 1$ using 41 ring operations. (Side note: 41 is not minimal.) Ring operation: 0, 1, +, -, \cdot . This computation: 1; 2 = 1 + 1; $2^2 = 2 \cdot 2$; $2^3 = 2^2 \cdot 2$; $2^6 = 2^3 \cdot 2^3$; $2^{12} = 2^{6} \cdot 2^{6} : 2^{13} = 2^{12} \cdot 2 : 2^{26} : 2^{27} : 2^{54} :$ 2^{55} ; 2^{110} ; 2^{111} ; 2^{222} ; 2^{444} ; 2^{888} ; 2^{1776} ; 2^{3552} ; 2^{7104} ; 2^{14208} ; 2^{28416} ; 2^{28417} ; 256834.2113668.2227336.2454672.2909344. 2⁹⁰⁹³⁴⁵; 2¹⁸¹⁸⁶⁹⁰; 2¹⁸¹⁸⁶⁹¹; 2³⁶³⁷³⁸²; $2^{3637383}$: $2^{7274766}$: $2^{7274767}$: $2^{14549534}$; $2^{14549535}$: $2^{29099070}$: $2^{58198140}$; $2^{116396280}$; $2^{232792560}$; $2^{232792560}$ -1.

prime p $2^{232792560} - 1$

of 2 in the cative group \mathbf{F}_{p}^{*} s = 232792560.

ays for this to happen: 60 has 960 divisors.

many? s = 232792560, 2, 3, 4, 5, . . . , 20} $2^{2} \cdot 5 \cdot 7 \cdot 11 \cdot 13 \cdot 17 \cdot 19.$

Can compute $2^{232792560} - 1$ using 41 ring operations. (Side note: 41 is not minimal.) Ring operation: 0, 1, +, -, \cdot . This computation: 1; 2 = 1 + 1; $2^2 = 2 \cdot 2$; $2^3 = 2^2 \cdot 2$; $2^6 = 2^3 \cdot 2^3$; $2^{12} = 2^6 \cdot 2^6 : 2^{13} = 2^{12} \cdot 2 : 2^{26} : 2^{27} : 2^{54} :$ 2^{55} ; 2^{110} ; 2^{111} ; 2^{222} ; 2^{444} ; 2^{888} ; 2^{1776} ; 2^{3552} ; 2^{7104} ; 2^{14208} ; 2^{28416} ; 2^{28417} ; 256834.2113668.2227336.2454672.2909344. 2⁹⁰⁹³⁴⁵; 2¹⁸¹⁸⁶⁹⁰; 2¹⁸¹⁸⁶⁹¹; 2³⁶³⁷³⁸²;

 $2^{3637383}$; $2^{7274766}$; $2^{7274767}$; $2^{14549534}$; $2^{14549535}$; $2^{29099070}$; $2^{58198140}$; $2^{116396280}$; $2^{232792560}$; $2^{232792560}$ -1.

Given po can com using 41 Notation e.g. *c* = 2^{27} mo

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Can compute $2^{232792560} - 1$ using 41 ring operations. (Side note: 41 is not minimal.) Ring operation: 0, 1, +, -, \cdot . This computation: 1; 2 = 1 + 1; $2^2 = 2 \cdot 2$; $2^3 = 2^2 \cdot 2$; $2^6 = 2^3 \cdot 2^3$; $2^{12} = 2^{6} \cdot 2^{6} : 2^{13} = 2^{12} \cdot 2 : 2^{26} : 2^{27} : 2^{54} :$ 2^{55} ; 2^{110} ; 2^{111} ; 2^{222} ; 2^{444} ; 2^{888} ; 2^{1776} ; 2^{3552} ; 2^{7104} ; 2^{14208} ; 2^{28416} ; 2^{28417} ; 256834.2113668.2227336.2454672.2909344. 2⁹⁰⁹³⁴⁵; 2¹⁸¹⁸⁶⁹⁰; 2¹⁸¹⁸⁶⁹¹; 2³⁶³⁷³⁸²; $2^{3637383}$; $2^{7274766}$; $2^{7274767}$; $2^{14549534}$; $2^{14549535}$; $2^{29099070}$; $2^{58198140}$; $2^{116396280}$; $2^{232792560}$; $2^{232792560}$ -1.

Given positive intercan compute 2²³²⁷ using 41 operation Notation: *a* mod *b*

- e.g. c = 85972312 $2^{27} \mod c = 1342$
 - $2^{54} \mod c = 1342$
- = 9356 $2^{55} \mod c = 1871$
- $2^{110} \mod c = 1071$ $2^{110} \mod c = 1871$
- = 1458
- $2^{232792560} 1 \mod 1$

en:

19.

Can compute $2^{232792560} - 1$ using 41 ring operations. (Side note: 41 is not minimal.) Ring operation: 0, 1, +, -, \cdot . This computation: 1; 2 = 1 + 1; $2^2 = 2 \cdot 2$; $2^3 = 2^2 \cdot 2$; $2^6 = 2^3 \cdot 2^3$; $2^{12} = 2^{6} \cdot 2^{6} : 2^{13} = 2^{12} \cdot 2 : 2^{26} : 2^{27} : 2^{54} :$ 2^{55} ; 2^{110} ; 2^{111} ; 2^{222} ; 2^{444} ; 2^{888} ; 2^{1776} ; 2^{3552} ; 2^{7104} ; 2^{14208} ; 2^{28416} ; 2^{28417} ; 256834.2113668.2227336.2454672.2909344. 2⁹⁰⁹³⁴⁵: 2¹⁸¹⁸⁶⁹⁰: 2¹⁸¹⁸⁶⁹¹: 2³⁶³⁷³⁸²: 2³⁶³⁷³⁸³: 2⁷²⁷⁴⁷⁶⁶: 2⁷²⁷⁴⁷⁶⁷: 2¹⁴⁵⁴⁹⁵³⁴: $2^{14549535}$; $2^{29099070}$; $2^{58198140}$; $2^{116396280}$; $2^{232792560}$; $2^{232792560}$ -1.

Given positive integer n, can compute $2^{232792560} - 1$ using 41 operations in \mathbf{Z}/c .

- Notation: $a \mod b = a b$
- e.g. *c* = 8597231219: . . .
 - $2^{27} \mod c = 134217728;$
 - $2^{54} \mod c = 134217728^2 \mod c$ = 935663516;
 - $2^{55} \mod c = 1871327032;$
- $2^{110} \mod c = 1871327032^2$ n
 - = 1458876811;.
- $2^{232792560} 1 \mod c = 56260$

Can compute $2^{232792560} - 1$ using 41 ring operations. (Side note: 41 is not minimal.)

Ring operation: 0, 1, +, -, \cdot .

This computation: 1; 2 = 1 + 1; $2^2 = 2 \cdot 2$; $2^3 = 2^2 \cdot 2$; $2^6 = 2^3 \cdot 2^3$; $2^{12} = 2^6 \cdot 2^6 : 2^{13} = 2^{12} \cdot 2 : 2^{26} : 2^{27} : 2^{54} :$ 2^{55} ; 2^{110} ; 2^{111} ; 2^{222} ; 2^{444} ; 2^{888} ; 2^{1776} ; 2^{3552} ; 2^{7104} ; 2^{14208} ; 2^{28416} ; 2^{28417} ; 256834.2113668.2227336.2454672.2909344. 2⁹⁰⁹³⁴⁵: 2¹⁸¹⁸⁶⁹⁰: 2¹⁸¹⁸⁶⁹¹: 2³⁶³⁷³⁸²: 2³⁶³⁷³⁸³: 2⁷²⁷⁴⁷⁶⁶: 2⁷²⁷⁴⁷⁶⁷: 2¹⁴⁵⁴⁹⁵³⁴: $2^{14549535}$: $2^{29099070}$: $2^{58198140}$; $2^{116396280}$; $2^{232792560}$; $2^{232792560}$ -1.

Given positive integer n, can compute $2^{232792560} - 1 \mod c$ using 41 operations in \mathbf{Z}/c . Notation: $a \mod b = a - b |a/b|$. e.g. *c* = 8597231219: . . . $2^{27} \mod c = 134217728;$ $2^{54} \mod c = 134217728^2 \mod n$ $2^{55} \mod c = 1871327032;$ $2^{110} \mod c = 1871327032^2 \mod c$ $2^{232792560} - 1 \mod c = 5626089344.$

- = 935663516;
- $= 1458876811; \ldots;$

Can compute $2^{232792560} - 1$ using 41 ring operations. (Side note: 41 is not minimal.)

Ring operation: 0, 1, +, -, \cdot .

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Given positive integer n, can compute $2^{232792560} - 1 \mod c$ using 41 operations in \mathbf{Z}/c . Notation: $a \mod b = a - b |a/b|$. e.g. *c* = 8597231219: . . . $2^{27} \mod c = 134217728;$ $2^{54} \mod c = 134217728^2 \mod n$ $2^{55} \mod c = 1871327032;$ $2^{110} \mod c = 1871327032^2 \mod c$ $2^{232792560} - 1 \mod c = 5626089344.$ Easy extra computation (Euclid):

 $gcd{5626089344, c} = 991.$

- = 935663516;
- $= 1458876811; \ldots;$

npute $2^{232792560} - 1$

ring operations.

te: 41 is not minimal.)

eration: 0, 1, +, -, \cdot .

nputation: 1; 2 = 1 + 1; 2: $2^3 = 2^2 \cdot 2$; $2^6 = 2^3 \cdot 2^3$; $\cdot 2^{6}: 2^{13} = 2^{12} \cdot 2: 2^{26}: 2^{27}: 2^{54}:$ $: 2^{111}: 2^{222}: 2^{444}: 2^{888}: 2^{1776}:$ $104: 2^{14208}: 2^{28416}: 2^{28417}:$ 13668.2227336.2454672.2909344. $2^{1818690}$; $2^{1818691}$; $2^{3637382}$; : 2⁷²⁷⁴⁷⁶⁶: 2⁷²⁷⁴⁷⁶⁷: 2¹⁴⁵⁴⁹⁵³⁴; $5: 2^{29099070}: 2^{58198140}:$ $^{30}: 2^{232792560}: 2^{232792560} - 1.$

Given positive integer n, can compute $2^{232792560} - 1 \mod c$ using 41 operations in \mathbf{Z}/c . Notation: $a \mod b = a - b |a/b|$. e.g. *c* = 8597231219: ... $2^{27} \mod c = 134217728;$ $2^{54} \mod c = 134217728^2 \mod n$ = 935663516; $2^{55} \mod c = 1871327032;$ $2^{110} \mod c = 1871327032^2 \mod c$ $= 1458876811; \ldots;$ $2^{232792560} - 1 \mod c = 5626089344.$ Easy extra computation (Euclid): $gcd{5626089344, c} = 991.$

This p – quickly f Main wo Could in c's divisi The 167 would ha Not clea Dividing is faster The p – only 70 trial divi

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ations.

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, 1, +, -, \cdot .

1; 2 = 1 + 1; $2 \cdot 2$; $2^6 = 2^3 \cdot 2^3$; $2^{12} \cdot 2: 2^{26}: 2^{27}: 2^{54}:$ $2:2^{444}:2^{888}:2^{1776}:$ $3:2^{28416}:2^{28417}:$ 336.2454672.2909344. 1818691; 23637382; $2^{7274767}$: $2^{14549534}$; $0:2^{58198140}$ $560: 2^{232792560} - 1.$

Given positive integer n, can compute $2^{232792560} - 1 \mod c$ using 41 operations in \mathbf{Z}/c . Notation: $a \mod b = a - b |a/b|$. e.g. *c* = 8597231219: ... $2^{27} \mod c = 134217728;$ $2^{54} \mod c = 134217728^2 \mod n$ = 935663516; $2^{55} \mod c = 1871327032;$ $2^{110} \mod c = 1871327032^2 \mod c$ $= 1458876811; \ldots;$ $2^{232792560} - 1 \mod c = 5626089344.$ Easy extra computation (Euclid): $gcd{5626089344, c} = 991.$

This p-1 method quickly factored c Main work: 27 squ Could instead have c's divisibility by 2 The 167th trial div would have found Not clear which m Dividing by small is faster than squa The p-1 method only 70 of the prir trial division finds

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+ 1; $2^3 \cdot 2^3$; $2^{27}; 2^{54};$ $38:2^{1776}:$ 28417. 2⁹⁰⁹³⁴⁴. 8637382. 14549534. 0. 2560 - 1.

Given positive integer n, can compute $2^{232792560} - 1 \mod c$ using 41 operations in \mathbf{Z}/c . Notation: $a \mod b = a - b |a/b|$. e.g. *c* = 8597231219: . . . $2^{27} \mod c = 134217728;$ $2^{54} \mod c = 134217728^2 \mod n$ = 935663516; $2^{55} \mod c = 1871327032;$ $2^{110} \mod c = 1871327032^2 \mod c$ $= 1458876811; \ldots;$ $2^{232792560} - 1 \mod c = 5626089344.$ Easy extra computation (Euclid):

 $gcd{5626089344, c} = 991.$

This p - 1 method (1974 Po quickly factored c = 859723

- Main work: 27 squarings mo
- Could instead have checked
- *c*'s divisibility by 2, 3, 5,
- The 167th trial division
- would have found divisor 99
- Not clear which method is b
- Dividing by small p
- is faster than squaring mod
- The p-1 method finds
- only 70 of the primes \leq 100 trial division finds all 168 pr

Given positive integer n, can compute $2^{232792560} - 1 \mod c$ using 41 operations in \mathbf{Z}/c . Notation: $a \mod b = a - b |a/b|$.

e.g. *c* = 8597231219: . . . $2^{27} \mod c = 134217728;$ $2^{54} \mod c = 134217728^2 \mod n$ = 935663516; $2^{55} \mod c = 1871327032;$ $2^{110} \mod c = 1871327032^2 \mod c$ $= 1458876811; \ldots;$ $2^{232792560} - 1 \mod c = 5626089344.$

Easy extra computation (Euclid): $gcd{5626089344, c} = 991.$

This p - 1 method (1974 Pollard) quickly factored c = 8597231219. Main work: 27 squarings mod c. Could instead have checked c's divisibility by 2, 3, 5, The 167th trial division would have found divisor 991. Not clear which method is better. Dividing by small p is faster than squaring mod *c*. The p-1 method finds only 70 of the primes < 1000;

trial division finds all 168 primes.

ositive integer n, pute $2^{232792560} - 1 \mod c$ operations in \mathbf{Z}/c . n: $a \mod b = a - b |a/b|$. 8597231219: ... d c = 134217728; $d c = 134217728^2 \mod n$ = 935663516;d c = 1871327032; $d c = 1871327032^2 \mod c$ $= 1458876811; \ldots;$ $^{50}-1 \mod c = 5626089344.$ ra computation (Euclid):

6089344, *c*} = 991.

This p - 1 method (1974 Pollard) quickly factored c = 8597231219. Main work: 27 squarings mod c.

Could instead have checked c's divisibility by 2, 3, 5, . . . The 167th trial division would have found divisor 991.

Not clear which method is better. Dividing by small pis faster than squaring mod c. The p - 1 method finds only 70 of the primes ≤ 1000 ; trial division finds all 168 primes.

Pollard) 31219. nod *c*. d . 91. Scale up $s = \operatorname{lcm}$ using 13 find 231 ls a squa faster th Or $s = \operatorname{lcm}$ using 14 find 180 ls a squa faster th Extra be no need eger n, $^{792560} - 1 \mod c$ is in \mathbf{Z}/c . b = a - b |a/b|. 219: ... 217728; 217728² mod *n* 63516; .327032; $.327032^2 \mod c$ 876811; ...; c = 5626089344.tation (Euclid): c = 991.

This p - 1 method (1974 Pollard) quickly factored c = 8597231219. Main work: 27 squarings mod c. Could instead have checked *c*'s divisibility by 2, 3, 5, The 167th trial division would have found divisor 991. Not clear which method is better. Dividing by small p is faster than squaring mod *c*. The p-1 method finds only 70 of the primes \leq 1000; trial division finds all 168 primes.

Scale up to larger $s = \text{lcm}\{1, 2, 3, 4,$ using 136 squaring find 2317 of the p

Is a squaring mod faster than 17 tria Or

 $s = \text{lcm}\{1, 2, 3, 4,$ using 1438 squarin find 180121 of the

Is a squaring mod faster than 125 tri

Extra benefit: no need to store t mod c

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clid):

This p - 1 method (1974 Pollard) quickly factored c = 8597231219. Main work: 27 squarings mod c. Could instead have checked *c*'s divisibility by 2, 3, 5, The 167th trial division would have found divisor 991. Not clear which method is better. Dividing by small p is faster than squaring mod c. The p-1 method finds only 70 of the primes \leq 1000; trial division finds all 168 primes.

Scale up to larger exponent $s = \text{lcm}\{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, \dots, 100\}$ using 136 squarings mod c find 2317 of the primes ≤ 10 Is a squaring mod c faster than 17 trial divisions

Or

 $s = \text{Icm}\{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, \dots, 100\}$ using 1438 squarings mod c find 180121 of the primes \leq

Is a squaring mod c

faster than 125 trial division

Extra benefit:

no need to store the primes.

This p - 1 method (1974 Pollard) quickly factored c = 8597231219. Main work: 27 squarings mod c.

Could instead have checked c's divisibility by 2, 3, 5, The 167th trial division would have found divisor 991.

Not clear which method is better. Dividing by small p is faster than squaring mod *c*. The p-1 method finds only 70 of the primes < 1000; trial division finds all 168 primes.

Scale up to larger exponent $s = \text{lcm}\{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, \dots, 100\}$: using 136 squarings mod c find 2317 of the primes $< 10^5$. Is a squaring mod c faster than 17 trial divisions? Or $s = \text{lcm}\{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, \dots, 1000\}$: using 1438 squarings mod c find 180121 of the primes $\leq 10^7$. Is a squaring mod c faster than 125 trial divisions? Extra benefit: no need to store the primes.

- 1 method (1974 Pollard) Factored c = 8597231219. ork: 27 squarings mod c.

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- $\exp \sqrt{\left(\frac{1}{2} + o(1)\right)}\log H \log \log h$ then p-1 divides $\operatorname{lcm}\{1, 2, ...$ for $H/K^{1+o(1)}$ primes $p \leq H$ Same if p-1 is replaced by order of 2 in \mathbf{F}_p^* .
- So uniform random prime p divides $2^{\text{lcm}\{1,2,...,K\}} 1$
- with probability $1/K^{1+o(1)}$.
- (1.4...+o(1))K squarings produce $2^{\operatorname{lcm}\{1,2,...,K\}}-1$ me
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Plausible conjecture: if K is $\exp \sqrt{\left(\frac{1}{2} + o(1)\right)\log H \log \log H}$ for $H/K^{1+o(1)}$ primes $p \leq H$. Same if p - 1 is replaced by order of 2 in \mathbf{F}_{p}^{*} . So uniform random prime $p \leq H$ divides $2^{\text{lcm}\{1,2,...,K\}} - 1$ with probability $1/K^{1+o(1)}$. (1.4...+o(1))K squarings mod c produce $2^{\text{lcm}\{1,2,...,K\}} - 1 \mod c$. finds far fewer primes for large H.

then p-1 divides lcm $\{1, 2, \ldots, K\}$

- Similar time spent on trial division


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- $\{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, \dots, 1000\}:$ 38 squarings mod *c* 121 of the primes $\leq 10^7$.
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Safe primes

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- This means numbers are eas to factor if their factors p_i have smooth $p_i - 1$.
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- ANSI does recommend
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 $\frac{1}{2} + o(1) \log H \log \log H$ 1 divides lcm $\{1, 2, ..., K\}$ $1^{1+o(1)}$ primes $p \leq H$. p-1 is replaced by

2 in F_{p}^{*} .

- $m random prime p \leq H$ $2^{lcm\{1,2,\ldots,K\}} - 1$
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
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(1982 Williams) (3/5, 4/5) in the group Cloc is divisible by 455 of the primes $\leq 10^5$;

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- Define $(X, Y) \in \mathbf{Q} \times \mathbf{Q}$ as t 232792560th multiple of
- The integer $S_2 = 5^{232792560}$
- 82 of the primes $\leq 10^3$;
- 223 of the primes $\leq 10^4$;
- 720 of the primes $\leq 10^6$;

Safe primes

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The p+1 factorization method (1982 Williams) Define $(X, Y) \in \mathbf{Q} \times \mathbf{Q}$ as the 232792560th multiple of (3/5, 4/5) in the group $Clock(\mathbf{Q})$. The integer $S_2 = 5^{232792560} X$ is divisible by 82 of the primes $< 10^3$: 223 of the primes $\leq 10^4$; 455 of the primes $< 10^5$; 720 of the primes $< 10^6$; etc.

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Define $(X, Y) \in \mathbf{Q} \times \mathbf{Q}$ as the 232792560th multiple of (3/5, 4/5) in the group $Clock(\mathbf{Q})$.

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Given an integer ccompute $5^{23279256}$ and compute gcd hoping to factor c

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If -1 is not a square and p + 1 divides then $5^{232792560}X$ r

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Given an integer c, compute $5^{232792560}X \mod C$ and compute gcd with *c*, hoping to factor c. Many p's not found by \mathbf{F}_{p}^{*} are found by $Clock(\mathbf{F}_p)$. If -1 is not a square mod pand p + 1 divides 232792560 then $5^{232792560} X \mod p = 0$ Proof: $p \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$, so

- $(4/5 + 3i/5)^p = 4/5 3i/5$ so (p+1)(3/5, 4/5) = (0, 1)in the group $Clock(\mathbf{F}_p)$ so 232792560(3/5, 4/5) = (

The p+1 factorization method

(1982 Williams)

Define $(X, Y) \in \mathbf{Q} \times \mathbf{Q}$ as the 232792560th multiple of (3/5, 4/5) in the group $Clock(\mathbf{Q})$.

The integer $S_2 = 5^{232792560} X$ is divisible by 82 of the primes $\leq 10^3$; 223 of the primes $< 10^4$; 455 of the primes $< 10^5$; 720 of the primes $< 10^6$; etc.

Given an integer c, compute $5^{232792560}X \mod c$ and compute gcd with c, hoping to factor c. Many p's not found by \mathbf{F}_{p}^{*} are found by $Clock(\mathbf{F}_p)$. If -1 is not a square mod pand p + 1 divides 232792560 then $5^{232792560} X \mod p = 0$. Proof: $p \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$, so $(4/5 + 3i/5)^p = 4/5 - 3i/5$ and so (p+1)(3/5, 4/5) = (0, 1)in the group $Clock(\mathbf{F}_p)$

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Given an integer *c*, compute $5^{232792560}X \mod c$ and compute gcd with c, hoping to factor c.

Many p's not found by \mathbf{F}_{p}^{*} are found by $Clock(\mathbf{F}_p)$.

If -1 is not a square mod pand p + 1 divides 232792560 then $5^{232792560} X \mod p = 0$.

Proof: $p \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$, so $(4/5 + 3i/5)^p = 4/5 - 3i/5$ and so (p+1)(3/5, 4/5) = (0, 1)in the group $Clock(\mathbf{F}_p)$ so 232792560(3/5, 4/5) = (0, 1).

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Given an integer c, compute $5^{232792560}X \mod c$ and compute gcd with c, hoping to factor c.

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If -1 is not a square mod pand p + 1 divides 232792560 then $5^{232792560}X \mod p = 0$.

Proof: $p \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$, so $(4/5 + 3i/5)^p = 4/5 - 3i/5$ and so (p+1)(3/5, 4/5) = (0, 1)in the group $\text{Clock}(\mathbf{F}_p)$ so 232792560(3/5, 4/5) = (0, 1).

The elliptic-curve Stage 1: Point P compute R = sP $s = \text{lcm}\{2, 3, \ldots,$ Stage 2: Small pri $B_1 < q_1, \ldots, q_k \leq$ compute $R_i = q_i F$ If order of P on E (same curve, redu divides sq_i , then $R_i = (0, 1)$ (using Compute $gcd{c, [}$

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so 232792560(3/5, 4/5) = (0, 1).

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The elliptic-curve method

- Stage 1: Point P on E over compute R = sP for
- $s = \text{lcm}\{2, 3, \ldots, B_1\}.$
- Stage 2: Small primes
- $B_1 < q_1, \ldots, q_k < B_2$
- compute $R_i = q_i R$.
- If order of P on E/\mathbf{F}_{p_i}
- (same curve, reduce mod p_i
- $R_i = (0, 1)$ (using Edwards)
- Compute $gcd{c, \prod y(R_i)}$.

Given an integer *c*, compute $5^{232792560}X \mod c$ and compute gcd with c, hoping to factor c.

Many p's not found by \mathbf{F}_{p}^{*} are found by $Clock(\mathbf{F}_p)$.

If -1 is not a square mod pand p + 1 divides 232792560 then $5^{232792560} X \mod p = 0$.

Proof: $p \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$, so $(4/5 + 3i/5)^p = 4/5 - 3i/5$ and so (p+1)(3/5, 4/5) = (0, 1)in the group $Clock(\mathbf{F}_p)$ so 232792560(3/5, 4/5) = (0, 1).

The elliptic-curve method

Stage 1: Point P on E over \mathbf{Z}/c , compute R = sP for $s = \operatorname{lcm}\{2, 3, \ldots, B_1\}.$

Stage 2: Small primes $B_1 < q_1, \ldots, q_k < B_2$ compute $R_i = q_i R$.

If order of P on E/\mathbf{F}_{p_i} (same curve, reduce mod p_i) divides sq_i , then $R_i = (0, 1)$ (using Edwards).

Compute $gcd{c, \prod y(R_i)}$.

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 $(i/5)^2 = 4/5 - 3i/5$ and
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 $(i/5)^2 = (0, 1)$.

Stage 1: Point P on E over \mathbf{Z}/c , compute R = sP for $s = \text{lcm}\{2, 3, \ldots, B_1\}.$

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- ; ⁰X mod c with c,
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- are mod *p* 232792560
- $\operatorname{mod} p = 0.$
- od 4), so (5 - 3i/5 and) (5) = (0, 1) (\mathbf{F}_p) (4/5) = (0, 1).

Stage 1: Point *P* on *E* over Z/c, compute R = sP for $s = \text{lcm}\{2, 3, ..., B_1\}$.

Stage 2: Small primes $B_1 < q_1, \ldots, q_k \leq B_2$ compute $R_i = q_i R$.

If order of P on E/\mathbf{F}_{p_i} (same curve, reduce mod p_i) divides sq_i , then $R_i = (0, 1)$ (using Edwards).

Compute $gcd\{c, \prod y(R_i)\}$.

Good news (for th All primes $\leq H$ fo reasonable numbe Order of elliptic-ci $\in [p+1-2\sqrt{p},p]$ If a curve fails, try Plausible conjectu $\exp \sqrt{\left(\frac{1}{2} + o(1)\right)}$ then, for each prin a uniform random has chance $\geq 1/B$ Find p using, $\leq B$ $\leq B_1^{2+o(1)}$ squarin Time subexponent

Stage 1: Point *P* on *E* over \mathbb{Z}/c , compute R = sP for $s = \text{lcm}\{2, 3, \dots, B_1\}$.

Stage 2: Small primes $B_1 < q_1, \ldots, q_k \leq B_2$ compute $R_i = q_i R$.

If order of P on E/\mathbf{F}_{p_i} (same curve, reduce mod p_i) divides sq_i , then $R_i = (0, 1)$ (using Edwards). Compute gcd{ $c, \prod y(R_i)$ }.

Good news (for the attacker All primes $\leq H$ found after reasonable number of curves Order of elliptic-curve group $\in [p+1-2\sqrt{p}, p+1+2\sqrt{p}]$ If a curve fails, try another. Plausible conjecture: if B_1 i $\exp \sqrt{\left(\frac{1}{2} + o(1)\right)\log H \log \log h}$ then, for each prime $p \leq H$, a uniform random curve mo has chance $\geq 1/B_1^{1+o(1)}$ to Find p using, $\leq B_1^{1+o(1)}$ cur $\leq B_1^{2+o(1)}$ squarings. Time subexponential in H.

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Stage 1: Point P on E over \mathbf{Z}/c , compute R = sP for $s = \text{Icm}\{2, 3, \ldots, B_1\}.$

Stage 2: Small primes $B_1 < q_1, \ldots, q_k < B_2$ compute $R_i = q_i R$.

If order of P on E/\mathbf{F}_{p_i} (same curve, reduce mod p_i) divides sq_i , then $R_i = (0, 1)$ (using Edwards). Compute $gcd{c, \prod y(R_i)}$.

Good news (for the attacker): All primes $\leq H$ found after reasonable number of curves. Order of elliptic-curve group $\in [p+1-2\sqrt{p}, p+1+2\sqrt{p}].$ If a curve fails, try another. Plausible conjecture: if B_1 is $\exp \sqrt{\left(\frac{1}{2} + o(1)\right)\log H \log \log H}$ then, for each prime $p \leq H$, a uniform random curve mod p Find p using, $\leq B_1^{1+o(1)}$ curves; $\leq B_1^{2+o(1)}$ squarings. Time subexponential in H.

- has chance $\geq 1/B_1^{1+o(1)}$ to find *p*.

otic-curve method

Point P on E over \mathbf{Z}/c , e R = sP for $\{2, 3, \ldots, B_1\}.$

Small primes , . . . , $q_k \leq B_2$ $R_i = q_i R_i$

of P on E/\mathbf{F}_{p_i} urve, reduce mod p_i) q_i , then , 1) (using Edwards).

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Good news (for the attacker): All primes $\leq H$ found after reasonable number of curves. Order of elliptic-curve group $\in [p+1-2\sqrt{p}, p+1+2\sqrt{p}].$ If a curve fails, try another. Plausible conjecture: if B_1 is $\exp \sqrt{\left(\frac{1}{2} + o(1)\right)\log H \log \log H}$ then, for each prime $p \leq H$, a uniform random curve mod p has chance $\geq 1/B_1^{1+o(1)}$ to find p. Find p using, $\leq B_1^{1+o(1)}$ curves;

 $\leq B_1^{2+o(1)}$ squarings. Time subexponential in H.

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2012.02.17 Heninger-Durumeric–Wustrow–Halder announcement (USENIX Se 2012): checked $>10^7$ SSL/SSH RS keys; factored 24816 SSL ke 2422 SSH host keys. "Almost all of the vulnerable were generated by and are u secure embedded hardware of such as routers and firewalls to secure popular web sites : as your bank or email provid

Bad RSA randomness

2004 Bauer–Laurie: checked 18000 PGP RSA keys; found 2 keys sharing a factor.

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These computations find q_2

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- $p_4 q_2, p_5 q_5, p_6 q_6;$
- and thus also p_2 and p_4 .
- Obvious: GCD computation.
- Faster: scaled remainder tre
- Nice follow-up project:
- Do this with Taiwan citizen
- Online data base of RSA key
- These were generated on
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2012.02.17 Heninger-Durumeric–Wustrow–Halderman announcement (USENIX Security 2012): checked $>10^7$ SSL/SSH RSA keys; factored 24816 SSL keys, 2422 SSH host keys.

"Almost all of the vulnerable keys were generated by and are used to secure embedded hardware devices such as routers and firewalls, not to secure popular web sites such as your bank or email provider."

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
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
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
These computations find q_2 in $p_1q_1, p_2q_2, p_3q_3,$ *p*₄*q*₂, *p*₅*q*₅, *p*₆*q*₆; and thus also p_2 and p_4 . Obvious: GCD computation. Faster: scaled remainder trees. Nice follow-up project: Do this with Taiwan citizen cards. Online data base of RSA keys.

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
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
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Closer look at the 119 prime

These computations find q_2 in p_1q_1 , p_2q_2 , p_3q_3 , p_4q_2 , p_5q_5 , p_6q_6 ; and thus also p_2 and p_4 . Obvious:GCD computation. Faster: scaled remainder trees.


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
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But: student broke 103 keys.

Closer look at the 119 primes



- computations find q_2 in
- q₂, p₃q₃,
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


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
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
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
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
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Prime p110 appears 46 times 00000000000000000000000000000000002f9




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Prime p110 appears 46 times which is the next prime after $2^{511} + 2^{510}$. Next up c9242492249292499249492449242492 24929249924949244924249224929249 92494924492424922492924992494924 492424922492924992494924492424e5 Several other factors exhibit such a pattern.

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Prime p110 appears 46 times 000000000000000000000000000000000002f9 which is the next prime after $2^{511} + 2^{510}$


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


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Prime p110 appears 46 times 00000000000000000000000000000000000002f9 which is the next prime after $2^{511} + 2^{510}$.

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Prime generation

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Prime generation

Choose a bit pattern of length 1, 3, 5, or 7 bits, repeat it to cover more than 512 bits, and truncate to exactly 512 bits.

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Several other factors exhibit such a pattern.

Prime generation

Choose a bit pattern of length 1, 3, 5, or 7 bits, repeat it to cover more than 512 bits, and truncate to exactly 512 bits. For every 32-bit word, swap the lower and upper 16 bits.

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Prime generation

Choose a bit pattern of length 1, 3, 5, or 7 bits, repeat it to cover more than 512 bits, and truncate to exactly 512 bits. For every 32-bit word, swap the lower and upper 16 bits. Fix the most significant two bits to 11.

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Prime generation

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Factoring by trial division

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Computing GCDs moduli, of which 1

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Do this for any pattern: 0,1,001,010,011,100,101,11000001,00010,00011,00100,00101,... Computing GCDs factored 105 moduli, of which 18 were new.

Choose a bit pattern of length 1, 3, 5, or 7 bits, repeat it to cover more than 512 bits, and truncate to exactly 512 bits.

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Do this for any pattern: 0,1,001,010,011,100,101,11000001,00010,00011,00100,00101,... Computing GCDs factored 105 moduli, of which 18 were new. Breaking RSA-1024 by "trial division". Factored 4 more keys using patterns of length 9.

Choose a bit pattern of length 1, 3, 5, or 7 bits, repeat it to cover more than 512 bits, and truncate to exactly 512 bits.

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Do this for any pattern: 0,1,001,010,011,100,101,11000001,00010,00011,00100,00101,... Computing GCDs factored 105 moduli, of which 18 were new. Breaking RSA-1024 by "trial division". Factored 4 more keys using patterns of length 9. More factors by studying other keys and using lattices. "Factoring RSA keys from certified smart cards: Coppersmith in the wild" (with D.J. Bernstein, Y.-A. Chang, C.-M. Cheng, L.-P. Chou, N. Heninger, N. van Someren) http://smartfacts.cr.yp.to/

g by trial division

a bit pattern of length 1, 7 bits, repeat it to cover an 512 bits, and truncate ly 512 bits.

y 32-bit word, swap the

d upper 16 bits.

most significant two bits

next prime greater than to this number.

for any pattern: 010,011,100,101,110 0010,00011,00100,00101,... Computing GCDs factored 105 moduli, of which 18 were new. Breaking RSA-1024 by "trial division". Factored 4 more keys using patterns of length 9. More factors by studying other keys and using lattices. "Factoring RSA keys from certified smart cards: Coppersmith in the wild" (with D.J. Bernstein, Y.-A. Chang, C.-M. Cheng, L.-P. Chou, N. Heninger, N. van Someren) http://smartfacts.cr.yp.to/

Bad RS/

- M. Nem
- D. Kline
- **AII RSA**
- Infineon
- *n* mod 2
- *n* mod 1
- *n* mod 3
- *n* mod 9
- *n* mod 3

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Bad RSA random

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- $n \mod 97 \in \{1, 35\}$
- $n \mod 331 \in \{1, 3\}$

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Bad RSA randomness 2017

 $n \mod 2 = 1$

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- All RSA keys generated by s
- Infineon smart cards satisfy
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Bad RSA randomness 2017 – ROCA

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These give $1 \cdot 2 \cdot 3 \cdot 6 \cdot 2 = 72$ possibilities of *n* mod *L*, where $1 \cdot 10 \cdot 36 \cdot 96 \cdot 330 = 11404800$

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Bad RSA randomness 2017 – ROCA

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$n \mod 2 \cdot 11 \cdot 37 \cdot 97 \cdot 331$ \in {1, 65537, 4878941,

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Bad RSA randomness 2017 – ROCA

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Bad RSA randomness 2017 – ROCA

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Infineon smart cards satisfy
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How do these turn

$\log_2 L \approx 971$ and so $p = p' + k \cdot L$, where $p \equiv p' \mod$ $gcd\{k, L\} = 1$ and is random so that Same for q.

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How do these turn into primes?

 $\log_2 L \approx 971$ and $\log_2 p = 1024$, so $p = p' + k \cdot L$, where $p \equiv p' \mod L$, and k with $gcd\{k, L\} = 1$ and $\log_2 k \approx 53$ is random so that p is prime. Same for q.

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Lenstra's "Divisors in Residue Classes" finds prime factors of the form $p = u + k \cdot L$ efficiently if $L > n^{1/3}$. Coppersmith, Howgrave-Graham, and Nagaraj work for $L \ge n^{1/4}$. $\log_2 L > 970 > 683 > 2048/3.$

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Run Lensta for all $p' \in {65537^i \mod L | i \in \mathbb{Z} }$.

- Each run is cheap, but
- there are many options for p', e.g. $65537^i \mod 23 \in$
- $\{\pm 1, \pm 2, \pm 3, \pm 4, \dots, \pm 9, \pm$

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So use L'|L which minimizes number of choices \times runtime.

- $\{\pm 1, \pm 2, \pm 3, \pm 4, \ldots, \pm 9, \pm 10, \pm 11\}.$
- But L is much larger than needed.

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It would p' as $p' \equiv 2^{r_1}$ $p' \equiv 3^{r_2}$ $p' \equiv 3^{r_3}$ $p' \equiv 2^{r_4}$ $p' \equiv 2^{r_5}$ with r; reconstr Note: 2 so this g $2 \cdot 4 \cdot 6 \cdot$

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L, and k with $\log_2 k \approx 53$ p is prime.

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What went wrong

- It would have been p' as
- $p' \equiv 2^{r_1} \mod 3$
- $p' \equiv 3^{r_2} \mod 5$
- $p' \equiv 3^{r_3} \mod 7$
- $p' \equiv 2^{r_4} \mod 11$
- $p'\equiv 2^{r_5} \mod 13$
- with r_i random ar
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- Note: 2 and 3 are so this gives
- $2 \cdot 4 \cdot 6 \cdot 10 \cdot 12 =$

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Full attack

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What went wrong here?

It would have been OK to c

- $p' \equiv 2^{r_1} \mod 3$
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- $p' \equiv 3^{r_3} \mod 7$
- $p' \equiv 2^{r_4} \mod 11$
- $p' \equiv 2^{r_5} \mod 13$
- with r_i random and p'
- reconstructed using CRT.
- Note: 2 and 3 are generator
- $2 \cdot 4 \cdot 6 \cdot 10 \cdot 12 = 5760$ opti

Full attack

Run Lensta for all $p' \in$ $\{65537^i \mod L | i \in \mathbf{Z}\}.$ Each run is cheap, but there are many options for p', e.g. 65537' mod 23 \in $\{\pm 1, \pm 2, \pm 3, \pm 4, \ldots, \pm 9, \pm 10, \pm 11\}.$

But L is much larger than needed. So use L'|L which minimizes number of choices \times runtime.

What went wrong here?

It would have been OK to choose p' as $p' \equiv 2^{r_1} \mod 3$ $p' \equiv 3^{r_2} \mod 5$ $p' \equiv 3^{r_3} \mod 7$ $p' \equiv 2^{r_4} \mod 11$ $p' \equiv 2^{r_5} \mod 13$ with r_i random and p'reconstructed using CRT. Note: 2 and 3 are generators, so this gives

$2 \cdot 4 \cdot 6 \cdot 10 \cdot 12 = 5760$ options.

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sta for all $p' \in$ $mod L | i \in \mathbf{Z} \}.$ n is cheap, but e many options for $65537' \mod 23 \in$ $\pm 3, \pm 4, \ldots, \pm 9, \pm 10, \pm 11$.

much larger than needed. L'|L which minimizes of choices \times runtime.

What went wrong here?

It would have been OK to choose p' as $p' \equiv 2^{r_1} \mod 3$ $p' \equiv 3^{r_2} \mod 5$ $p' \equiv 3^{r_3} \mod 7$ $p' \equiv 2^{r_4} \mod 11$ $p' \equiv 2^{r_5} \mod 13$ with r_i random and p'reconstructed using CRT. Note: 2 and 3 are generators, so this gives $2 \cdot 4 \cdot 6 \cdot 10 \cdot 12 = 5760$ options.

It would but wors to choos $p' \equiv 2^{r_1}$ $p' \equiv 2^{r_2}$ $p' \equiv 2^{r_3}$ $p' \equiv 2^{r_4}$ $p' \equiv 2^{r_5}$ with r_i reconstr Note: 2 this give $2 \cdot 4 \cdot 3 \cdot$

 $p' \in \mathbb{Z}$.

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but worse $p' \equiv 2^{r_1} \mod 3$ $p' \equiv 2^{r_2} \mod 5$ this gives only

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 $10, \pm 11\}.$

It would have OK'ish

- to choose p' as
- $p' \equiv 2^{r_3} \mod 7$
- $p' \equiv 2^{r_4} \mod 11$
- $p' \equiv 2^{r_5} \mod 13$
- with r_i random and p'
- reconstructed using CRT.
- Note: 2 is not always a gene
- $2 \cdot 4 \cdot 3 \cdot 10 \cdot 12 = 2880$ opti

What went wrong here?

It would have been OK to choose p' as

- $p' \equiv 2^{r_1} \mod 3$
- $p' \equiv 3^{r_2} \mod 5$
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ent wrong here?

- have been OK to choose
- mod 3
- mod 5
- mod 7
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- mod 13
- random and p'
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- and 3 are generators, ives
- $10 \cdot 12 = 5760$ options.

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It is real to replace exponen $p' \equiv 547$ with r r Note: The orde modulo are 2,4,6 are linke Instead this give options.

here?

n OK to choose

nd p'

g CRT.

generators,

5760 options.

It would have OK'ish but worse to choose p' as $p' \equiv 2^{r_1} \mod 3$ $p' \equiv 2^{r_2} \mod 5$ $p' \equiv 2^{r_3} \mod 7$ $p' \equiv 2^{r_4} \mod 11$ $p' \equiv 2^{r_5} \mod 13$ with r_i random and p'reconstructed using CRT. Note: 2 is not always a generator, this gives only $2 \cdot 4 \cdot 3 \cdot 10 \cdot 12 = 2880$ options.

It is really bad to replace this by exponentiation and $p' \equiv 5477^r \mod 3^2$ with *r* random.

Note:

The orders of 547⁷ modulo 3,5,7,11, a are 2,4,6,2, and 6, are linked.

Instead of 2 · 4 · 6 this gives Icm{2, 4 options.

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but worse
to choose
$$p'$$
 as
 $p' \equiv 2^{r_1} \mod 3$
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 $p' \equiv 2^{r_3} \mod 7$
 $p' \equiv 2^{r_5} \mod 13$
with r_i random and p'
reconstructed using CRT.It is real
to replay
exponent
 $p' \equiv 5^{2}$
with r_i
reconstructed using CRT.s,Note: 2 is not always a generator,
this gives only
 $2 \cdot 4 \cdot 3 \cdot 10 \cdot 12 = 2880$ options.It is real
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ally bad ace this by a single entiation and choose μ $477^r \mod 3 \cdot 5 \cdot 7 \cdot 11$ random.

ders of 5477 o 3,5,7,11, and 13 .,6,2, and 6, but the p ked.

d of $2 \cdot 4 \cdot 6 \cdot 2 \cdot 6 =$ ves $lcm{2, 4, 6, 2, 6} =$ S.

It would have OK'ish but worse to choose p' as $p' \equiv 2^{r_1} \mod 3$ $p' \equiv 2^{r_2} \mod 5$ $p' \equiv 2^{r_3} \mod 7$ $p' \equiv 2^{r_4} \mod 11$ $p' \equiv 2^{r_5} \mod 13$ with r_i random and p'reconstructed using CRT. Note: 2 is not always a generator, this gives only $2 \cdot 4 \cdot 3 \cdot 10 \cdot 12 = 2880$ options.

It is really bad to replace this by a single exponentiation and choose p' as $p' \equiv 5477^r \mod 3 \cdot 5 \cdot 7 \cdot 11 \cdot 13$ with r random. Note: The orders of 5477 modulo 3,5,7,11, and 13 are 2,4,6,2, and 6, but the powers are linked.

Instead of $2 \cdot 4 \cdot 6 \cdot 2 \cdot 6 = 576$ this gives lcm $\{2, 4, 6, 2, 6\} = 12$ options.