

# Stream Ciphers and Block Ciphers

Guest Lecture for 2WC12 Cryptography I - Fall 2011

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# Introduction

## Stream Ciphers:

- ▶ symmetric-key cipher
- ▶ state-driven: operates on arbitrary message length
- ▶ commonly used stream ciphers: A5/1 and A5/2 (GSM), RC4 (SSL, WEP), eSTREAM Project

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## Synchronous Stream Ciphers:

Given key  $K$  and initial state  $\sigma_0$ :

state:	$\sigma_{i+1} = f(\sigma_i, K)$	with next-state function $f$
key stream:	$z_i = g(\sigma_i, K)$	with key-stream function $g$
cipher stream:	$c_i = h(z_i, m_i)$	with output function $h$

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## Self-Synchronizing Stream Ciphers:

Given key  $K$  and initial state  $\sigma_0$ :

$$\text{state:} \quad \sigma_{i+1} = (c_i, c_{i-1}, \dots, c_{i-t+1})$$

$$\text{key stream:} \quad z_i = g(\sigma_i, K) \quad \text{with key-stream function } g$$

$$\text{cipher stream:} \quad c_i = h(z_i, m_i) \quad \text{with output function } h$$

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- ▶ commonly used block ciphers: DES, Triple-DES, AES

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An  $n$ -bit block cipher is a function  $E : \{0, 1\}^n \times \mathfrak{K} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ .  
For each fixed  $K \in \mathfrak{K}$  the map

$$E_K : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n, M \mapsto E(M, K)$$

is invertible (bijective) with inverse  $E_K^{-1} : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ .



# From Block Ciphers to Stream Ciphers

## Mode of Operation:

- ▶ Electronic codebook (ECB) mode:
  - ▶ Encryption:  
obtain ciphertext  $C_1, \dots, C_t$  as  $C_i = E_K(M_i), i = 1 \dots t$
  - ▶ Decryption:  
obtain plaintext  $M_1, \dots, M_t$  as  $M_i = E_K^{-1}(C_i), i = 1 \dots t$

# From Block Ciphers to Stream Ciphers

## Mode of Operation:

- ▶ Electronic codebook (ECB) mode
- ▶ Cipher-block chaining (CBC) mode:  
Use a (non-secret) initialization vector ( $IV$ ) of length  $n$  bits.
  - ▶ Encryption:  
obtain ciphertext  $C_1, \dots, C_t$  as  
$$C_i = E_K(M_i \oplus C_{i-1}), i = 1 \dots t, C_0 = IV$$
  - ▶ Decryption:  
obtain plaintext  $M_1, \dots, M_t$  as  
$$M_i = E_K^{-1}(C_i) \oplus C_{i-1}, i = 1 \dots t, C_0 = IV$$

# From Block Ciphers to Stream Ciphers

## Mode of Operation:

- ▶ Electronic codebook (ECB) mode
- ▶ Cipher-block chaining (CBC) mode
- ▶ Cipher feedback (CFB) mode:  
Use a (non-secret) initialization vector ( $IV$ ) of length  $n$  bits.
  - ▶ Encryption:  
obtain ciphertext  $C_1, \dots, C_t$  as  
$$C_i = E_K(C_{i-1}) \oplus M_i, i = 1 \dots t, C_0 = IV$$
  - ▶ Decryption:  
obtain plaintext  $M_1, \dots, M_t$  as  
$$M_i = E_K(C_{i-1}) \oplus C_i, i = 1 \dots t, C_0 = IV$$

# From Block Ciphers to Stream Ciphers

## Mode of Operation:

- ▶ Electronic codebook (ECB) mode
- ▶ Cipher-block chaining (CBC) mode
- ▶ Cipher feedback (CFB) mode
- ▶ Output feedback (OFB) mode:  
Use a (non-secret) initialization vector ( $IV$ ) of length  $n$  bits.
  - ▶ Encryption:  
obtain ciphertext  $C_1, \dots, C_t$  as  
 $C_i = O_i \oplus M_i, i = 1 \dots t, O_i = E_K(O_{i-1}), O_0 = IV$
  - ▶ Decryption:  
obtain plaintext  $M_1, \dots, M_t$  as  
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# From Block Ciphers to Stream Ciphers

## Mode of Operation:

- ▶ Electronic codebook (ECB) mode
- ▶ Cipher-block chaining (CBC) mode
- ▶ Cipher feedback (CFB) mode
- ▶ Output feedback (OFB) mode
- ▶ Counter (CTR) mode:

Use a (non-secret) initialization vector ( $IV$ ) of length  $n$  bits.

- ▶ Encryption:

obtain ciphertext  $C_1, \dots, C_t$  as

$$C_i = E_K(N_i) \oplus M_i, i = 1 \dots t, N_i = N_{i-1} + 1 \pmod{2^n}, N_0 = IV$$

- ▶ Decryption:

obtain plaintext  $M_1, \dots, M_t$  as


$$M_i = E_K(N_i) \oplus C_i, i = 1 \dots t, N_i = N_{i-1} + 1 \pmod{2^n}, N_0 = IV$$

## Properties of the Block-Cipher Modes of Operation

- ▶ ECB is considered insecure if applied to more than one block: Identical input blocks are mapped to identical output blocks.
- ▶ In CBC and CFB mode, the last ciphertext block  $C_t$  depends on all message blocks  $M_1, \dots, M_t$ , in ECB, OFB, and CTR mode each block of ciphertext  $C_i$  only on message block  $M_i$ .
- ▶ CBC, CFB, and OFB encryption can not be performed in parallel on several blocks, ECB and CTR encryption can. CBC and CFB decryption also can be performed in parallel.
- ▶ Only ECB and CTR allow random access to the ciphertext.
- ▶ CBC and ECB require padding of the input to a multiple of the block size, CFB, OFB, and CTR don't.
- ▶ For OFB, CFB, and CTR mode each two messages encrypted with the same key must use a different  $IV$ .
- ▶ Most widely used modes are CBC and CTR.

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# An Example for Block Ciphers: AES

## History:

- ▶ **September 1997:** NIST issued a public call for a new block cipher, supporting a block length of 128 bits and lengths of 128, 192, and 256 bits.
- ▶ **August 1998 and March 1999:** AES1 and AES2 conferences organized by NIST.
- ▶ **August 1999:** NIST announces 5 finalists:
  - ▶ MARS (IBM)
  - ▶ RCG (Rivest, Robshaw, Sidney, Yin)
  - ▶ Rijndael (Daemen, Rijmen)
  - ▶ Serpent (Anderson, Biham, Knudsen)
  - ▶ Twofish (Schneier)
- ▶ **April 2000:** AES3 conference
- ▶ **October 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2000:** NIST announces that Rijndael has been selected as the proposed AES



# An Example for Block Ciphers: AES

## Parameters:

- ▶ fixed block size of 128bit
- ▶ variable key size (in bits): AES-128, AES-192, AES-256

## Animation:

[http://www.cs.bc.edu/~straubin/cs381-05/blockciphers/rijndael\\_ingles2004.swf](http://www.cs.bc.edu/~straubin/cs381-05/blockciphers/rijndael_ingles2004.swf)

# An Example for Block Ciphers: AES

Rijndael S-box:

For  $y$  in  $GF(2^8) = GF(2)[x]/(x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1)$  compute

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x_0 \\ x_1 \\ x_2 \\ x_3 \\ x_4 \\ x_5 \\ x_6 \\ x_7 \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

with  $x = y^{-1}$ .

# An Example for Block Ciphers: AES

## Rijndael S-box:

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	c	d	e	f
00	63	7c	77	7b	f2	6b	6f	c5	30	01	67	2b	fe	d7	ab	76
10	ca	82	c9	7d	fa	59	47	f0	ad	d4	a2	af	9c	a4	72	c0
20	b7	fd	93	26	36	3f	f7	cc	34	a5	e5	f1	71	d8	31	15
30	04	c7	23	c3	18	96	05	9a	07	12	80	e2	eb	27	b2	75
40	09	83	2c	1a	1b	6e	5a	a0	52	3b	d6	b3	29	e3	2f	84
50	53	d1	00	ed	20	fc	b1	5b	6a	cb	be	39	4a	4c	58	cf
60	d0	ef	aa	fb	43	4d	33	85	45	f9	02	7f	50	3c	9f	a8
70	51	a3	40	8f	92	9d	38	f5	bc	b6	da	21	10	ff	f3	d2
80	cd	0c	13	ec	5f	97	44	17	c4	a7	7e	3d	64	5d	19	73
90	60	81	4f	dc	22	2a	90	88	46	ee	b8	14	de	5e	0b	db
a0	e0	32	3a	0a	49	06	24	5c	c2	d3	ac	62	91	95	e4	79
b0	e7	c8	37	6d	8d	d5	4e	a9	6c	56	f4	ea	65	7a	ae	08
c0	ba	78	25	2e	1c	a6	b4	c6	e8	dd	74	1f	4b	bd	8b	8a
d0	70	3e	b5	66	48	03	f6	0e	61	35	57	b9	86	c1	1d	9e
e0	e1	f8	98	11	69	d9	8e	94	9b	1e	87	e9	ce	55	28	df
f0	8c	a1	89	0d	bf	e6	42	68	41	99	2d	0f	b0	54	bb	16

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## Security Concerns:

- ▶ Theoretical attacks reduce security of AES-128 to  $2^{126.1}$ .
- ▶ Cache-timing attacks are practical attacks but require precise timing measurements.  
→ AES implementations must be resistant to timing attacks!

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## High-Speed Implementations:

- ▶ NaCl: <http://nacl.cr.yp.to/features.html>
- ▶ <http://cryptojedi.org/crypto/index.shtml#aesbs>

# Cryptographic Attack Methods

## Plaintext-Based Attacks:

- ▶ known plaintext
- ▶ chosen plaintext
- ▶ adaptive chosen plaintext



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- ▶ adaptive chosen ciphertext

## Linear Cryptanalysis:

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## Differential Cryptanalysis:

- ▶ chosen plaintext attack
- ▶ statistical analysis of the difference of two inputs and the difference of the outputs

# Literature

## Stream and Block Ciphers:

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## Linear and Differential Cryptanalysis:

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