Elliptic-curve cryptography II


Clocks over finite fields

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2MMC10 - Cryptology

Addition on the clock



$$(x_1, y_1)+(x_2, y_2) = (x_3, y_3)$$

= $(x_1y_2 + y_1x_2, y_1y_2 - x_1x_2).$

$$(x_1, y_1) + (0, 1) = (x_1, y_1).$$


 $(x_1, y_1) + (-x_1, y_1) = (0, 1).$

$$2\left(\frac{3}{5}, \frac{4}{5}\right) = \left(\frac{24}{25}, \frac{7}{25}\right).$$

$$3\left(\frac{3}{5},\frac{4}{5}\right) = \left(\frac{117}{125},\frac{-44}{125}\right).$$


$$4\left(\frac{3}{5},\frac{4}{5}\right) = \left(\frac{336}{625},\frac{-527}{625}\right).$$

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Problem: The coordinates show a clear growth! $625 = 5^4$ leaks 4 and pattern continues.

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Solution: Consider points on clock modulo a prime.

Clocks over finite fields

```
\operatorname{Clock}(\mathbf{F}_7) = \{(x,y) \in \mathbf{F}_7 \times \mathbf{F}_7 : x^2 + y^2 = 1\}.
\operatorname{Here} \mathbf{F}_7 = \{0,1,2,3,4,5,6\}
= \{0,1,2,3,-3,-2,-1\}
\operatorname{with} +, -, \times \operatorname{modulo} 7.
\operatorname{E.g.} \ 2 \cdot 5 = 3 \ \operatorname{and} \ 3/2 = 5 \ \operatorname{in} \ \mathbf{F}_7.
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
$$(x_1, y_1)+(x_2, y_2)=(x_3, y_3)=(x_1y_2+y_1x_2, y_1y_2-x_1x_2)$$

works also for coordinates in F_7 .

Clock cryptography

The "Clock Diffie-Hellman protocol":

Standardize large prime p and base point $(x, y) \in \operatorname{Clock}(\mathbf{F}_p)$.



They use a(b(x,y)) = b(a(x,y)) as shared secret.

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How to compute aP?

```
a = 44444 # our super secret scalar. No, not that one.
l = a.nbits()
A = a.bits()
R = P
for i in range(l-2,-1,-1):
    R = 2 R
    if A[i] == 1:
        R = R + P
print(R)
```

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Warning #3:

Attacker sees more than public keys a(x, y) and b(x, y).

Attacker sees how much *time* Alice uses to compute a(b(x,y)). Often attacker can see time for *each operation* performed by Alice, not just total time. This reveals secret scalar a.

Do not use double-and-add as stated on previous page! Calls to if leak bit pattern of a.