


Diffie-Hellman key exchange









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
2WF80: Introduction to Cryptology

Public-key authenticated encryption (“DH” data flow)




- ▶ Prerequisite: Alice has a private key  and public key .
- ▶ Prerequisite: Bob has a private key  and public key .
- ▶  and  determine the same key as  and .
- ▶ Alice and Bob use this shared key to authenticate and encrypt with symmetric cryptography.

Public-key authenticated encryption (“DH” data flow)



- ▶ Everybody knows a group G generator g .
- ▶ Prerequisite: Alice has a private key $a \in \mathbb{N}$ and public key $h_A = g^a$.
- ▶ Prerequisite: Bob has a private key $b \in \mathbb{N}$ and public key $h_B = g^b$.
- ▶ $h_B^a = (g^b)^a$
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- ▶ $h_B^a = (g^b)^a = g^{ab} = (g^a)^b = h_A^b$. Use hash of g^{ab} as key.
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Diffie–Hellman key exchange

- ▶ 1976 Diffie and Hellman introduce public-key cryptography.
- ▶ To use it, standardize group G and $g \in G$.
Everybody knows G and g as well as how to compute in G .
- ▶ Warning #1: Many G are unsafe!

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 - ▶ $G = (\mathbb{Q}, \cdot)$, $g = 2$, $h_A = 65536$ means $a = 16$. In general, just check bitlength.
 - ▶ $G = (\mathbb{F}_p, +)$, i.e., A sends $h_A \equiv ag \pmod{p}$.
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- ▶ Diffie and Hellman suggested $G = (\mathbb{F}_p^*, \cdot)$ with g a primitive element, i.e., a generator of the whole group.
- ▶ Used in practice $G \subset (\mathbb{F}_p^*, \cdot)$ with g an element of large prime order.
- ▶ More commonly used in practice G is group of points on an elliptic curve over \mathbb{F}_p . Stay on for 2MMC10 for details.

Hardness assumptions

- ▶ Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP):
Given g, g^a, g^b compute g^{ab} .
- ▶ Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDHP):
Given g, g^a, g^b , and g^c decide whether $g^c = g^{ab}$.
- ▶ Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP):
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Practical problems

- ▶ Eve can set up a *man-in-the-middle* attack:

$$A \xleftrightarrow{g^{ae}} E \xleftrightarrow{g^{bf}} B$$

E decrypts everything from A and reencrypts it to B and vice versa.

- ▶ This attack cannot be detected unless A and B have some long-term keys that are known to each other or compare their keys out of band.

Semi-static DH

- ▶ A cryptosystem combining public-key and symmetric-key crypto is called a *hybrid system*
- ▶ Alice publishes long-term public key $h_A = g^a$, keeps long-term private key a .
- ▶ Any user can encrypt to Alice using this key:
 - ▶ Pick random k and compute $r = g^k$.
 - ▶ Encrypt message using symmetric keys derived from $H(h_A^k)$.
 - ▶ Send ciphertext c along with r .
 - ▶ Alice decrypts, by obtaining symmetric key from $H(r^a) = H(g^{ak})$.

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 - ▶ Alice decrypts, by obtaining symmetric key from $H(r^a) = H(g^{ak})$.
- ▶ Alice's key here is static, Bob's key is ephemeral.
- ▶ Note: ephemeral does not mean one-time; it means that is not long term.