

# Security notions for public-key cryptography

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2WF80: Introduction to Cryptology

# Security notions

Some requirements are obvious

- ▶ It should be hard to recover the private key  $sk$  from a public key  $pk$ .
- ▶ It should be hard to recover the plaintext from a ciphertext.
- ▶ It should be hard to forge a signature.

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- ▶ It should be hard to forge a signature.

But what powers does the attacker get?

# Signatures

## Attacker goals

- ▶ Recover  $sk$  from  $pk$ .
- ▶ Produce forgeries on any message  $m$ .  
i.e., break universal unforgeability (UU).
- ▶ Create some forgery (no control over the message),  
i.e., break existential unforgeability (EU).

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- ▶ Create some forgery (no control over the message),  
i.e., break existential unforgeability (EU).  
This is bad even if the attacker does not have control over what message the forgery is on.

## Attacker abilities

- ▶ Key only attack (KOA)  
Attacker only knows  $pk$ .
- ▶ Known message attack (KMA)  
Attacker knows some  $(m, \text{Sign}(m))$  pairs.
- ▶ Chosen message attack (CMA)  
Attacker can request signatures  $(m, \text{Sign}(m))$   
on messages  $m$  of his choice.

# Encryption

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- ▶ Recover  $sk$  from  $pk$ .
- ▶ Recover  $m$  from  $Enc_{pk}(m)$ ,  
i.e. break one-wayness (OW).
- ▶ Learn any information about plaintext (semantic security).

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Equivalent to breaking indistinguishability (IND),  
i.e., learning which of two attacker-chosen messages  $m_0, m_1$  was  
encrypted in  $c = Enc_{pk}(m_i)$  (beyond 50% chance of guessing.)

## Attacker abilities

- ▶ Chosen plaintext attack (CPA)  
Attacker gets encryption of plaintexts of his choice.
- ▶ Chosen ciphertext attack (CCA I / II)  
Attacker can ask for decryptions of ciphertexts of his choice.  
For II the attacker can continue asking for decryptions after  
receiving a challenge ciphertext.