

Stream ciphers: definition and IV

Tanja Lange

Eindhoven University of Technology

2WF80: Introduction to Cryptology

Reminder: one-time pad

- ▶ Let $m \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$, i.e., a message is a string of ℓ bits.
Let $k \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$, chosen uniformly at random.
Then $c = m + k$, where addition is done modulo 2 in each position.
(In more mathematical notation: $m, k \in \mathbb{F}_2^\ell, c = m + k$.)

$$\begin{array}{r} 011001110011001010010010111001 \\ + 010111101100011010110100101001 \\ \hline 001110011111010000100110010000 \end{array}$$

- ▶ The one-time pad is information-theoretically secure – there is no information about the plaintext in the ciphertext.
 $c_i = 0$ can come from $m_i = k_i = 0$ or from $m_i = k_i = 1$.
 $c_i = 1$ can come from $m_i = 0, k_i = 1$ or from $m_i = 1, k_i = 0$.

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- ▶ This requires the key to be as long as the message – the “two-time” pad is insecure.
This makes the scheme unusable for most situations.

Stream ciphers

- ▶ Alice and Bob share a “short” key (typically 128 - 256 bits).
- ▶ Stream ciphers take a key as input and generate long stream of pseudorandom numbers (typically bits or bytes).
- ▶ A good stream cipher produces a stream of numbers that
 - ▶ is unpredictable given any previous portion of the stream;
 - ▶ does not exhibit any non-random statistical properties.
- ▶ A minimum requirement is that the cipher output passes a battery of statistical tests, such as the Diehard tests.
- ▶ Encryption with a stream cipher works the same as with the OTP:

$$c = m + s,$$

where s is the stream cipher output.

Two-time pad

If Tom uses the same pad twice and if his messages always start with DEAR ALICE, (using ASCII encoding in hexadecimal, addition mod 16)

```
m1 = D E A R   A L I C E ,   L E T ' S   M E E T
m1 = 44 45 41 52 20 41 4C 49 43 45 2C 20 4C 45 54 27 53 20 4D 45 45 54
  p = 54 48 49 53 20 49 53 20 54 4F 54 41 4C 4C 59 20 52 41 4E 44 4F 4D
c1 = 98 8D 8A A5 40 8A 9F 69 97 84 70 61 88 81 AD 47 A5 61 8B 89 84 91

m2 = 44 45 41 52 20 41 4C 49 43 45 2C 20 54 4F 44 41 59 20 49 20 43 41
  p = 54 48 49 53 20 49 53 20 54 4F 54 41 4C 4C 59 20 52 41 4E 44 4F 4D
c2 = 98 8D 8A A5 40 8A 9F 69 97 84 70 61 90 8B 9D 61 AB 61 87 64 82 8E
```

then Eve notices the common start of the messages. This tells her

1. Tom is reusing p ,
2. the messages start with the same text.

(Anything else would be too much of a coincidence).

If Eve can get m_1 , e.g. by observing that the message went to Alice and then observing Alice meet Tom, she gets $p=c_1-m_1$ and $m_2=c_2-p$.

In any case, subtracting the ciphertexts gives m_1-m_2 (no sign of p).

This issue is not specific to OTP, same for stream ciphers.

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- ▶ We must avoid the issues of the two-time pad.
Given the description so far this means
 - ▶ Alice and Bob must remember how many output numbers they have used and continue from that point on.
 - ▶ Next message requires recomputing all past steps or keeping a state.
 - ▶ Lost messages desynchronize Alice and Bob.

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- ▶ Alice and Bob must remember how many output numbers they have used and continue from that point on.
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- ▶ Solve these issues by including an Initialization Vector (IV) so that

$$S : \{0, 1\}^v \times \{0, 1\}^\ell \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^*, \quad (IV, k) \mapsto s.$$

Typically, the output length is limited to some n , (a bound on) the length of the message to be encrypted.

- ▶ Encryption computes

$$(IV, m, s) \mapsto c = (IV, m + s).$$